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Curriculum Evaluation: State of 
the Field 
The field of curriculum evaluation is at present in a 
state of crisis. This statement is supported by an analy-
sis of crisis provided by the prominent historian and 
philosopher, Thomas s. Kuhn, in his influential study about 
paradigm changes in historical development (Kuhn, 1970) . 
According to Kuhn, a crisis in a field of activity is 
an indication that the existing paradigm "has ceased to 
function adequately" (p. 92). This malfunction or 
"breakdown" of the paradigm becomes apparent by the pres-
ence of persistent "anomalies." By anomalies he means dis-
crepancies between the findings produced by the application 
of the paradigm's tools (i.e., theories, concepts, methods, 
or instruments) and new sorts of evidence. These discrep-
ancies, as he notes, are characterized by a "stubborn 
refusal" to be "accommodated" within the existing paradigm 
(p. 97). 
In the curriculum evaluation field a dominant paradigm 
can be identified. This dominant paradigm comes from the 
positivist tradition of the natural sciences. It is 
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referred to here as the natural science paradigm. There is 
evidence which indicates that curriculum evaluation activi-
ties conducted under this dominant paradigm continually 
produce discrepant data. For example, Guba (1969), in his 
assessment of the status of the evaluation of curriculum 
innovations, asserts that 
... traditional methods of evaluation have 
failed educators in their attempts to assess the 
impact of innovations in operating systems. 
Indeed, for decades the evidence produced by the 
application of conventional evaluation procedures 
has contradicted the experiential evidence of the 
practitioner. Innovations have persisted in edu-
cation not because of the supporting evidence of 
evaluation but despite it (p. 19). 
Similarly, Stufflebeam et al. (1971), in their review of 
the evaluation of instructional programs, conclude that 
program evaluation consistently "produces findings that 
are at variance with experience and common observations" 
(p. 8). Perhaps the most substantial evidence of the pre-
sence of anomalous findings in natural-scientific evalua-
tions is the fact that many of those evaluations have been 
revised. Included in this revision are the Westing-
house/Ohio University Head Start investigation (Berk, 1981; 
Evans, 1971; Madaus, Airasian and Kellagham, 1980); the 
evaluations of Sesame Street and Plaza Sesame (Anderson et 
al., 1977); and several evaluations of Title I curricula 
funded under the Elementary and Secondary Education Act 
(ESEA) of 1965 (McLaughlin, 1975) . 
Although practitioners most committed to the dominant 
paradigm do acknowledge the presence of anomalies, they do 
not fault their paradigm. It is maintained that the factor 
2 
responsible for such a situation is the poor quality of 
evaluation practice. This position is best stated by 
Worthen (1977): 
It should not be surprising that there 
are poorly planned and executed evaluations; such 
failings will occur in any field of human endea-
vor. The problem is one of frequency and impor-
tance. So many key evaluations have been disap-
pointing that even some evaluation advocates are 
beginning to wonder whether evaluation can live 
up to its high potential ••.. Unless its practice 
is improved significantly in the next few years, 
evaluation will not only fail to meet its poten-
tial, but eventually may be discarded as another 
promising notion that failed to mature to useful-
ness (pp. 3-4). 
Worthen goes on to suggest the establishment of a mechanism 
of quality control (i.e., standards) for improving evalua-
tion practice. Similar proposals have been advanced by 
individual evaluators and several professional organiza-
tions. In fact, there are already two sets of evaluation 
standards available. A joint committee appointed by twelve 
different organizations, including the Association for 
Supervision and Curriculum Development, developed one set 
(Stufflebeam and Madaus, 1983). The Evaluation Research 
Society articulated the other (Rossi, 1982). 
Such a position in evaluation is not surprising. As 
Kuhn explicitly notes, practitioners of a paradigm, 
••• confronted by even severe and prolonged anoma-
lies •.. do not ••• treat anomalies as counter-
instances, though in the vocabulary of philoso-
phy ••. that is what they are (p. 77). 
This attitude toward anomalies derives, according to Kuhn, 
from not only practitioners' great confidence in the valid-
ity of their paradigm, but more important, from the very 
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dominance that the paradigm exerts over practitioners. As 
he puts it, "A paradigm governs, in the first instance, not 
a subject matter but rather a group of practitioners" (p. 
180). Barbour's (1980) brief summary of Kuhn's notion of 
the power of paradigms provides a good idea of how this 
dominance is exerted: 
A paradigm ••. implicitly defines for a given ••• 
community the types of question that may legiti-
mately be asked, the types of explanation that 
are to be sought, and the types of solution that 
are acceptable. It moulds the scientist's as-
sumptions as to what kinds of entity there are in 
the world ••• and the methods of enquiry suitable 
for studying them (p. 223). 
Training, Kuhn suggests, socializes practitioners in the 
implicit view of the paradigm. 
The study of paradigms ..• is what mainly prepares 
the student for membership in the particular 
••• community with which he will later practice. 
Because he there joins men who learned the bases 
of their field from the same concrete models, his 
subsequent practice will seldom evoke overt dis-
agreement over fundamentals.. Men whose research 
is based on shared paradigms are committed to the 
same rules and standards for ... practice (1970, p. 
11) • 
As suggested above, a breakdown at the level of 
paradigm is seldom acknowledged by practitioners. But the 
resulting effect of such a breakdown, which is the crisis, 
does not depend upon practitioners' recognition of the 
paradigm's breakdown. This resulting crisis, according to 
Kuhn, is characterized by four major signs. He identifies 
these four signs of crisis as (1) expressions of explicit 
discontent, (2) proliferation of theoretical alternates, 
(3) discussions and debates over legitimate methods, and 
(4) emergence of new paradigms. These four signs of 
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crisis, as the following discussion illustrate, are visible 
in the field of curriculum evaluation. 
Explicit Discontent 
The recent literature has already addressed the topic 
of discontent. For example, Eisner (1985b), in a review of 
the more general field of curriculum, comment upon the 
discontent in evaluation in particular. He views this 
discontent with optimism. He perceives it as a reaction 
against the "dominance of a scientific epistemo-logy" which 
has "excluded any other view of the way in which inquiry in 
education can legitimately be pursued" 
(p. 17). Eisner points to a group of discontented evalua-
tors and curricularists who are "beginning to look else-
where" for new modes of rationalities on which to base edu-
cational inquiry. Although he agrees with this search, he 
warns the discontent to try to 
•.• avoid the pitfall that so may progressives 
fell into, both in the 1930s and in the 1960s: 
namely the tendency toward romantic obscurantism, 
the infatuation with vague rhetoric that has lit-
tle intellectual rigor (p. 21). 
Jackson (1980) also discusses the topic of discontent. 
He identifies not only a group of discontented curricular-
ists but also several centers of activity where the discon-
tent is most intense. Among these centers are included the 
University of Rochester, and Stanford University. 
Although Jackson includes himself among these discon-
tents, he disagrees with several arguments advanced by what 
he calls the "extreme" position within the discontents. He 
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labels this position as "antiempirical." Such a position, 
he argues, makes claims about educational matters which 
they cannot substantiate. He views this extreme position 
with suspicion: 
••• I suspect that the ... extreme critics among our 
discontents would not be satisfied with the elim-
ination of trivial or poorly conducted empirical 
studies but, rather, would like to throw out the 
baby and the bath. In this extreme view, all 
attempts at quantification are seen as violating 
the complexity of reality. From this perspec-
tive, science--with all its talk about reliabil-
ity, objectivity, and the rest--is reduced to 
little more than vain posturing. I strongly dis-
agree with this extreme view and find it trou-
bling (p. 170). 
The origins of this discontent can be traced to the 
national curriculum reform movement of the early 1960s. 
During this period a number of new curriculum development 
projects, especially in the areas of science and mathema-
tics, were established. Funds were made available to eval-
uate these curriculum development efforts. Hyman and 
Napier's (1975) description of the dominant evaluation 
approach provides a good idea of how these curriculum 
development efforts were to be evaluated: 
... outcomes are hypothesized, an independent 
variable •.• the curriculum ... is introduced to an 
experimental population, control groups are 
identified, and pre and post test data are 
gathered on both the experimental and control 
populations. The task of the evaluator is to 
make sure that the objectives are clear and 
measurable, to develop the appropriate 
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instruments,and to report the results in a 
systematic manner in terms of which hypotheses 
have been supported and which should be rejected 
(p. 58). 
It was not so long before developers and implementers 
of these curriculum efforts were complaining about evalua-
tion results. Most of these new curricula resulted in "no 
significant difference," results which were in contradic-
tion with what was observed: that these new curricula were 
making a great difference in the education of children 
(Guba, 1969; Madaus, Stufflebeam, and Scriven, 1983; 
Stufflebeam et al., 1971). This complaint and other prob-
lems with evaluation were made explicit by Cronbach (1963) 
in a landmark article on evaluation entitled "Course 
Improvement Through Evaluation." In his introductory 
statement, Cronbach expressed: 
... I am becoming convinced that some techniques 
and habits of thought of the evaluation special-
ists are ill-suited to current curriculum stud-
ies. To serve these studies, what philosophy and 
methods of evaluation are required? And particu-
larly, how must we depart from the familiar doc-
trines and rituals of the testing game? (p. 672). 
Cronbach was against the use of norm-referenced test scores 
as a measure of curriculum effectiveness. According to 
Cronbach, such scores may produce some "confidence" in a 
given curriculum, but they will tell "very little about how 
to produce further improvement" (p. 680). He recommended, 
instead, the use of item data because he believed that 
those measures were "more likely ... to suggest how to alter 
the presentation" (p. 60) . He was also in disagreement 
with objective-based evaluations. He suggested the use of 
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decisions rather than objectives as the advance organizer 
of the evaluation; i.e., the particular focus for the 
information to be collected. 
Cronbach was one of the first to raise serious ques-
tions about the utility and relevance of comparative evalu-
ations. He advised evaluators to turn away from compar-
isons and to focus instead on the ways in which refinements 
and improvements could occur while the curriculum was in 
the process of development. As he put it, 
Evaluation used to improve the course when it is 
still fluid contributes more to improvement of 
education than evaluation used to appraise a 
product already placed on the market (p. 675). 
But Cronbach's recommendations went largely unnoticed 
(Madaus, Stufflebeam, and Scriven, 1983). Subsequent cur-
riculum development efforts, particularly those funded 
through the ESEA of 1965, received the traditional evalua-
tion treatment. The failure of these evaluations (Guba, 
1969) contributed to the spread of discontent in the field 
of curriculum evaluation. Curriculum evaluators such as 
Atkin (1968), Eisner (1967), Guba (1969), Scriven (1967), 
and Stake (1967) were among those evaluators who explicitly 
expressed their discontent with curriculum evaluation stud-
ies in the late 1960s. 
During the decade of the 1970s the discontent with 
curriculum evaluations grew in size and intensity. At pre-
sent this discontent, borrowing Jackson's (1980) expres-
sion, is "sufficiently widespread to be commented upon by 
any thoughtful observer" (p. 165). 
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Proliferation of Evaluation Models 
In a recent state-of-the-art assessment, Hilliard 
{1984) describes evaluation as a "hot bed of activity" (p. 
124). As he notes, evaluation theories "proliferate almost 
exponentially" {p. 117). In fact, a review of the theoret-
ical literature {Guba and Lincoln, 1981), reveals that more 
than forty alternative evaluation models have been already 
formalized. Such a proliferation of alternates, as Kuhn 
{1970) notes, signals a field in crisis. 
History ••• indicates that invention of alternates 
is just what scientists seldom undertake •••• So 
long as the tools a paradigm supplies continue to 
prove capable of solving the problem it 
defines •••• The reason is clear ••• retooling is an 
extravagance to be reserved for the occasion that 
demands it. The significance of crisis is the 
indication they provide that an occasion for 
retooling has arrived {p. 76). 
Several observers of the evaluation scene view the 
proliferation of evaluation models as creating confusion 
about the process of evaluation. Gephart {1976, in partie-
ular, comments: 
We have reached a point of absurdity! In a 
recent conversation 27 'different' models of the 
evaluation process were delineated •••. This sorry 
state of affairs is made even worse by our 
tendency to refer to the Stake, or Stufflebeam, 
or Scriven, or Atkin, or Scriven #2, or Provus 
models •.• {p. 2). 
Gay {1980) expresses: 
A false dichotomy has been fostered in the minds 
of many to the effect that classroom, or pupil, 
evaluation and other types of evaluation, such as 
project evaluation, involve entirely different 
processes. Further, it is incorrectly believed 
by a number of people that each type of evalua-
tion requires a different process or model. The 
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current proliferation of 'different' evaluation 
models only serves to reinforce this erroneous 
belief (p. 14). 
Related to this, Gay argues that the evaluation process is 
the same regardless of what is being evaluated. According 
to him, what differs in evaluation is the object being 
evaluated, how the process is applied, and the types of 
decisions made. Depending upon what is being evaluated, 
different kinds of data will be collected, different cri-
teria will be applied to the data, and different kinds of 
decisions will be made. 
Classification of Evaluation Models. Several attempts 
have been made to develop a classification scheme in order 
to discuss evaluation models. Popham (1975), for example, 
suggests a four classification-scheme based on emphasis. 
His four categories are (1) goal-attainment models, (2) 
judgmental models emphasizing intrinsic criteria, (3) judg-
mental models emphasizing extrinsic criteria, and (4) 
decision-facilitation models. According to Popham's 
scheme, the goal-attainment models predominate in the eval-
uation field. 
Worthen and Sanders (1973) use a three classification-
scheme, according to differences in evaluation strategies. 
Their three categories are (1) judgmental strategies, (2) 
decision management strategies, and (3) decision-objective 
strategies. Once they classified contemporary evaluation 
models within these categories, they proceed to analyze 
them in terms of twelve selected categories (pp. 210-215). 
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For Worthen and Sanders, the dominant approach to evalua-
tion, the Tyler model, emphasizes decision-objectives 
strategies. 
Stufflebeam and Webster (1980) classify evaluation 
approaches according to three categories: (1) politically-
oriented, (2) questions-oriented, and (3) values-oriented. 
Evaluation studies conceived within a politically-oriented 
perspective are labelled "pseudo-evaluations" (p. 6). They 
view those types of studies as politically controlled and 
inspired by public relations. The questions-oriented stud-
ies are described as "quasi-evaluations." They noted that 
these types of studies sometimes are incapable of assessing 
the worth of educational programs. 
These studies can be called quasi-evaluation 
studies, because sometimes they happen to provide 
evidence that can be used to assess the worth of 
an object; while, in other cases, their focus is 
too narrow or is only tangential to questions of 
worth ••• the main caution is that these types of 
studies not be equated with evaluation (p. 8). 
Two dominant types of evaluation studies, the objective-
based and the experimental research, are categorized 
as quasi-evaluations. In contrast, evaluation studies 
which they view as effective in assessing the worth of 
educational programs are those conducted within a value 
orientation; e.g., decision-oriented and client-centered 
studies. These studies are considered "true evaluations." 
Guba (1978) employs a two-category system to differen-
tiate among evaluation models. His categories are based on 
the forms of inquiry involved, either conventional or natu-
ralistic. According to Guba, conventional inquiry stems 
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from a positivist epistemology while naturalistic inquiry 
derives from phenomenology. Having established the episte-
mological bases of the two categories, he contrasts evalua-
tion models along thirteen dimensions. These dimensions 
are: (1) inquiry paradigm, (2) purpose, (3) stance, (4) 
framework/design, (5) style, (6) reality manifold, (7) 
value structure, (8) setting, (9) context, (10) conditions, 
(11) treatment, (12) scope, and (13) methods. Most 
evaluation models, Guba suggests, fall within the conven-
tional category. 
House (1979) proposes a two-classification scheme 
based on a taxonomy of the most prominent evaluation models 
(pp. 4-5). He categorizes those models either utilitarian 
or intuitionist-pluralists. According to House, both cate-
gories of models are based on variations in the assumptions 
of the ideology of liberalism. He compares the utilitarian 
and intuitionist-pluralist models in terms of their eth-
ical, epistemological, and political assumptions. He views 
the utilitarian models as dominating the evaluation field. 
In a recent work, Guba and Lincoln (1981) suggest that 
alternative evaluation models can be classified into 
schools based on what they take as advance organizers. 
They propose five organizers as categories: (1) objec-
tives, (2) decisions, (3) effects, (4) critical guidespots, 
and (5) issues and concerns. This latter category, issues 
and concerns, is the advance organizer of the responsive 
approach they particularly advocate. 
This book offers a new model of evaluation ••• 
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that organizes evaluation activities so as to 
provide information that illuminates the claims, 
concerns, and issues raised by stakeholding audi-
ences, that is, audiences involved with or af-
fected by the 'evaluand' (pp. ix-x). 
Methodological Debate 
What set of methods is most appropriate for evalua-
tion? This question has generated a heated debate between 
advocates of quantitative methods and proponents of quali-
tative methods. In general, the two method-types are 
viewed as incompatible, and a sharp distinction has been 
made between the two, particularly on the mode of inquiry 
employed and the basic purpose of such inquiries. 
Quantitative inquiry is described as hypothetico-
deductive, particularistic, inferential, verificatory, 
context-free, and outcome-oriented (Reichardt and Cook, 
1979; Patton, 1980). This type of inquiry, as Koetting 
(1984) explains, aims to 
.•• develop a 'nomothetic body of knowledge.' 
This knowledge is best stated in law-like 
(nomological generalizations) which are seen as 
truth statements outside of time and specific 
context ••• (p. 9). 
These nomological generalizations are used, in turn, to 
predict and control the phenomenon under investigation. 
In contrast, qualitative inquiry is viewed as indue-
tive, holistic, descriptive, exploratory, context-bound, 
and process-oriented (Reichardt and Cook, 1979; Patton, 
1980) • This type of inquiry is aimed at developing an 
"ideographic body of knowledge" that exemplifies the indi-
vidual case (Koetting, 1984, p. 10). As Von Wright (1971) 
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suggests, this aim is the concern of the human sciences, 
e.g., history, while the development of nomothetic knowl-
edge is the interest of the natural sciences. 
All these thinkers (Droysen, Dilthey, Simmel, 
Weber, Windelband, Rickert, Croce, and Colling-
wood) reject the methodological monism of posi-
tivism and refuse to view the pattern set by the 
exact natural sciences as the sole and supreme 
ideal for a rational understanding of reality. 
Many of them emphasize a contrast between those 
sciences which, like physics or chemistry or 
physiology, aim at generalizations about repro-
ducible and predictable phenomena, and those 
which, like history, want to grasp the individual 
and unique features of their objects. Windelband 
coined the label 'nomothetic' for sciences which 
search for laws, and 'ideographic' for the 
descriptive study of individuality (p. 5). 
There is evidence which indicates that a reconcilia-
tion between the two method-types has been attempted. For 
example, Reichardt and Cook (1979) have advanced the thesis 
that the two method-types are complementary. They provide 
a definition of the methods which they believe support 
their complementary thesis. They define quantitative meth-
ods as the "techniques of counting, scaling, and abstract 
reasoning" (p. 22). They contend that these techniques 
cannot replace qualitative methods since quantitative 
understanding presupposes qualitative knowing. According 
to them, the choice of a statistical model to fit the data, 
the interpretation of findings, and generalizations to 
other settings all rely on qualitative knowing. They view 
qualitative methods as the "techniques of personal under-
standing, common sense, and introspection" (p. 22). 
Patton (1980) proposes as a mode of reconciling the 
two methods a design strategy of "methodological mixes" 
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(p. 108). This strategy borrows and combines parts such as 
measurement data, design, and analysis of both methods. He 
proposes four mixed forms: 
1. Experimental design, qualitative measurement, and 
case analysis. 
2. Experimental design, qualitative measurement, and 
statistical analysis. 
3. A holistic-inductive natural design, qualitative 
measurement, and statistical analysis. 
4. A holistic-inductive natural design, quantitative 
measurement, and statistical analysis. 
According to Patton, these mixed forms must be matched 
to the nature and the needs of the evaluation problem and 
setting. Guba (1983) criticizes Patton's proposal as rele-
gating the distinctions between quantitative and qualita-
tive methods to "an epistemological oblivion" (p. 22). He 
argues that the difference between the two method-types is 
fundamentally epistemological. 
LeCompte and Goetz (1982) suggest a supplementary 
strategy. For example, they propose the introduction of 
experimental manipulation in ethnographic field work. They 
argue that ethnographic techniques tend to ignore the 
threats to internal and external validity. Supplementing 
·ethnographic techniques with experiments, they believe, can 
enhance the credibility of ethnographic findings. 
In a recent attempt to clarify the methodological 
debate, Smith (1983) criticizes the complementary position. 
Smith contends that such a position is obscuring the real 
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issues of the debate rather than clarifying them. In this 
regard, he expresses: 
How we go about the process of investigation car-
ries with it serious epistemological conse-
quences. These consequences go to the core of 
educational and social research. Rather than 
obscure the issues with polemics and name-call-
ings or accept the unfounded assumption that the 
methods are complementary, we must insure that 
the problem is the subject of serious and extend-
ed debate, not only among philosophers, but even 
more important, among practicing educational 
researchers (p. 13). 
In contrast, Reichardt and Cook (1979) insist that assuming 
an incompatibility stance in this controversy is mislead-
ing. They state: 
Treating the method-type as incompatible 
obviously encourages researchers to use one or 
the other when it may be a combination of the two 
that is best suited to research needs. It also 
paralyzes any attempt at reconciling the differ-
ences between the opposing sides of the debate 
over method-types. For these reasons, the con-
ceptualization of the method-types as antagonis-
tic may be leading astray current methodological 
debate and practice. It is our view that the 
paradigmatic perspective which promotes this 
incompatibility between method-types is in error 
(p. 11). 
As a way of response, Guba (1983) advises practitioners to 
be cautious with what he calls the "siren-song of compro-
mise." He expresses: 
The siren-song of compromise--dare we heed 
it? I think not ..•• I do not urge that you stop 
up your ears--it is important to recognize the 
song when you hear it. But great care must be 
taken to avoid being persuaded by it. The sirens 
are beautiful and sing well; only heroic measures 
will suffice to withstand them. I wish all of 
you Godspeed in the confrontation (p. 30). 
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Emergence of New Paradigms 
As previously indicated, curriculum evaluation is dom-
inated by the natural science paradigm. This dominant 
paradigm has been challenged by three emergent paradigms 
identified here as the legal, the anthropological, and the 
aesthetic. A review of literature in this area reveals 
that each paradigm has gained a constituency of advocates 
who claim it is their preferred paradigm the "paradigm of 
choice. 11 
The Legal Paradigm. During the late 1960s, Egon G. 
Guba suggested that evaluators might look for assistance in 
the field of law (cf Worthen and Rogers, 1980). In the 
early 1970s the first example of a legal evaluation in edu-
cation was conducted. Further interest in the legal 
approach to evaluation was stimulated by the conceptual 
work of Wolf (1974; 1975), Owens (1973), and Levine (1974). 
According to Wolf (1974), the legal paradigm can over-
come what he sees as three notable shortcomings in current 
evaluation practice: the quantification and oversimplifica-
tion of data, the neglect of the human intelligence as a 
powerful collector and interpreter of data, and the lack of 
credible procedures. He also contends that the emergence 
of three developments in evaluation, i.e., the political 
function of evaluation, evaluative advocacy, and the broad-
ening of acceptable evaluation evidence, makes additional 
case for considering the legal paradigm as the alternative 
in evaluation. 
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In a later work, Wolf (1975) proposes a judicial eval-
uation model which adopts certain concepts from jury trials 
and adversary proceedings. His model relies on the law's 
acceptance of human testimony to clarify and judge complex 
events. This model, as he explains, is aimed at "producing 
broad program understanding, exploring the complexity of 
educational issues, and keeping at least two sides of the 
truth alive" (pp. 185-186). Specifically, it provides for 
the "structured consideration of alternative arguments and 
inferences" in order to "keep the evaluation both intellec-
tually honest and fair" (p. 185). 
Owens (1973) also utilizes the technique of adversary 
proceedings. This technique, according to Owens, is based 
on the litigation principle of the fight theory, which 
states that "the facts in a case can be ascertained if each 
side strives as hard as it can, in a keenly partisan 
spirit, to bring to the court's attention the evidence 
favorable to that side" (p. 226). He suggests at least 
five uses of the adversary model in curriculum evaluation: 
(1) to explore the implicit values of the curriculum, (2) 
to estimate the congruence between the curriculum and the 
school system, (3) to select curriculum materials, (4) to 
judge the merits of the completed curriculum, and (5) to 
provide information to decision makers. 
A strong advocate of the adversary approach, Levine 
(1974) advances the thesis that the process of conducting 
an adversary proceeding in our legal system resembles the 
process of convincing a group of scientists of the validity 
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of a study. Such a parallel, he argues, provides evidence 
of the appropriateness of the adversary technique in evalu-
ation. He explains the parallel in this way: 
.•• the scientific enterprise as a whole follows 
an adversary model .... By an adversary model, I 
mean that we are dealing with a situation in 
which there are claims and counterclaims and 
arguments and counterarguments, each side 
advanced by an advocate who attempts to make the 
best possible case for his position. 
The scientific community, in form of ... a 
referee .•• acts as a judge does in a preliminary 
hearing, deciding whether there is sufficient 
case made in a particular study to take it to the 
trial before the scientific community. If pub-
lished, the particular position asserted in the 
paper is subject to cross-examination and further 
probing ..• critiques of experiments, or an area of 
study, may all be viewed as attacks on a particu-
lar position by advocates of another position (p. 
669) 0 
Levine's insistence of the appropriateness of the 
adversary technique in evaluation has gained opposition. 
Worthen and Rogers (1980), particularly, do not view this 
technique as the best pattern in legal evaluations. They 
make this statement: 
The legal paradigm has intriguing possibilities 
for some evaluation situations ...• We are not 
inclined, however, to view the legal paradigm 
as ••• the best pattern. In fact, one of our 
greatest concerns is that evaluators will seize 
on some of the more trivial features of the 
courtroom and fail to isolate and extract those 
adversarial aspects that might be most pertinent 
in education (p. 537). 
They also raise the suspicion that adversarial evaluations 
might "result in a seductive slide into what might be 
termed an 'indictment mentality,' which can do a disservice 
both to evaluation efforts and the program being evaluated" 
(p. 537) 0 
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The Anthropological Paradigm. The roots of this 
paradigm are traced to the Malinowski tradition in anthro-
pological/ethnographic field studies, and the Weberian tra-
dition in phenomenology (Guba, 1978). The literature on 
the anthropological paradigm, as applied to evaluation, 
began to appear during the late 1960s. Since the late 
1970s, proponents of this paradigm have initiated an inten-
sive campaign to convince the evaluation community of the 
appropriateness of their paradigm. 
The most fervent advocates of the anthropological 
paradigm maintain that this paradigm is not only in compe-
tition but also in opposition with the dominant natural 
science paradigm (Guba, 1978; Guba and Lincoln, 1981; 
Parlett and Hamilton, 1977; Patton, 1975; 1978; 1980). 
Patton (1978) establishes the contrast of the two paradigms 
in this way: 
Evaluation ..• is dominated by the largely 
unquestioned, natural science paradigm of hypo-
thetico-deductive methodology. This dominant 
paradigm assumes quantitative measurement, exper-
imental design, and multivariate, parametric sta-
tistical analysis to be the epitome of 'good' 
science. 
By way of contrast, the alternative to the 
dominant hypothetico-deductive paradigm is 
derived from the tradition of anthropological 
field studies. Using the techniques of in-depth, 
openended interviewing and personal observation, 
the alternative paradigm relies on qualitative 
data, holistic analysis, and detailed description 
derived from close contact with the targets of 
study (pp. 203-204). 
This type of methodology is termed by Guba (1978) as 
"naturalistic inquiry;" while he describes the methodology 
of the dominant natural science paradigm as "conventional 
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inquiry." He points out six major advantages of naturalis-
tic inquiry: (1) deals with emergent questions of interest, 
(2) provides an acceptable basis for studying process, (3) 
provides a better description of treatment-situation inter-
actions, (4) avoids implicit shaping of possible outcomes, 
(5) recognizes pluralistic values, and (6) optimizes gener-
alizabilty. 
Parlett and Hamilton (1977), in a description of their 
proposed illuminative evaluation approach, suggest the pur-
pose of the anthropological paradigm: 
The model described here, illuminative evalua-
tion, takes account of the wider context in which 
educational programs function. Its primary pur-
pose is with description and interpretation 
rather than measurement and prediction. It 
stands unambiguously within the alternative 
anthropological paradigm (pp. 9-10). 
According to Parlett and Hamilton, the task of illuminative 
evaluation is to provide a comprehensive understanding of 
the complex realities surrounding the curriculum. A simi-
lar purpose is guiding Stake's (1983) responsive approach. 
In fact, both approaches converge in many respects. This 
is clearly affirmed by Stake when he himself declares that 
Parlett and Hamilton's writings "for the most part are har-
monious with mine" (p. 291). Guba (1978), however, has 
shown greater preference for the responsive approach. 
According to Guba, this approach "seems very naturally 
wedded to the methodology of naturalistic inquiry" of both 
ethnographers and phenomenologists (p. 35). 
21 
Several critics point out that there is no need for a 
competition between the natural science and the anthropo-
logical paradigms. It is argued that these paradigms can 
be used either in conjunction or alone so as to best ''fit" 
the demands of the evaluation problem at hand. Reichardt 
and Cook (1979), in particular, counsel evaluators to 
••. feel free to change their paradigmatic stance 
as the need arises. These is no reason to sub-
scribe to one mix of attributes at all times. 
Rather, in moving from one program to the next or 
from one study to the next ..• the paradigmatic 
stance that is most appropriate .•• is likely to 
change. Thus, a researcher's paradigmatic view-
point should be flexible and adaptive (p. 19). 
Strong advocates of the dominant natural science paradigm, 
however, have raised suspicion that the use of the anthro-
pological paradigm in evaluation might result in promoting 
a type of inquiry which can be termed "journalistic report-
ing," "anecdotal," or "impressionistic story-telling." 
The Aesthetic Paradigm. This paradigm is supported by 
a group of curriculum critics. Its internal antecedents 
can be found in the "reconceptual movement" in the more 
general field of curriculum. This movement attempts to 
reconceptualize the curriculum field around human con-
sciousness, personal meaning, and collective action 
(Giroux, 1981; Pinar, 1978). Huebner (1966), following a 
critique of the dominance of technical values in curriculum 
theorizing and practice, suggested the need for viewing and 
assessing the curriculum aesthetically. Building upon 
Huebner's suggestion, Mann (1969) formulated the concept of 
"curriculum criticism," and articulated the task of the 
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curriculum critic, i.e., to disclose meaning inherent in 
both the curriculum design and in the choices made by its 
designers. 
Since the early 1970s, Elliot Eisner has become the 
leading advocate of the aesthetic paradigm in curriculum 
evaluation. In a recent work, Eisner (1985b), after ana-
lyzing the controlling effects of scientific evaluation 
procedures upon educational practice, proposes a critical 
evaluation approach called "educational criticism." This 
approach to evaluation "takes its lead from the work that 
critics have done in literature, theater, film, music, and 
the visual arts" (p. 216). In postulating the reason for 
choosing specifically the fine arts as the basis for his 
critical approach, Eisner declares: 
The arts are not a second-class substitute for 
expression, they are one of the major means peo-
ple throughout history have used both to concep-
tualize and express what has been inexpressible 
in discursive terms (p. 226). 
He further claims that it is through the arts that 
... we have the opportunity to participate vicari-
ously in the lives of others, to acquire an empa-
thetic understanding of situations, and therefore 
to know them in ways that only the arts can 
reveal (p. 227). 
According to Eisner, educational criticism is composed 
of three major aspects or dimensions: descriptive, inter-
pretive, and evaluative. The descriptive dimension is 
essentially an attempt to portray or render in artistic 
language the qualities and meanings of classroom life. The 
interpretive dimension represents an effort to understand 
the meaning of classroom events. The evaluative dimension 
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is concerned with making value judgments of the educational 
import of what has been described and interpreted. In 
general, educational criticism is aimed at illuminating the 
complexities of classroom life. Perhaps Eisner (1985b) 
explains it best when he states: 
The major aim of such activity is not primarily 
to discover laws but rather to illuminate, to 
provide those concerned with education with the 
kind of understanding that will enhance their own 
teaching or professional deliberations .... It 
aims not at the reduction of complexities but at 
their illumination in order that the factors and 
qualities that make situations unique as well as 
general can be understood (p. 380). 
The educational criticism approach, as Guba and 
Lincoln (1981) point out, has the "honor to be the first to 
break cleanly" with the dominant natural science paradigm 
(p. 20). But this new perspective in curriculum evalua-
tion, like the legal and anthropological paradigms, has 
also raised suspicions. In particular, Stufflebeam and 
Webster (1980) suspect that a critical stance in evaluation 
might leave ample room for "subjectivity, bias, and corrup-
tion" (p. 17). But, as Kuhn (1970) indicates, to look at 
new candidates for paradigm with suspicion is very typical. 
In this particular, he comments: 
At the start a new candidate for paradigm may 
have few supporters, and on occasions the sup-
porters' motives may be suspect. Nevertheless, 
if they are competent, they will improve it, 
explore its possibilities, and show what it would 
be like to belong to the community guided by it. 
And as that goes on, if the paradigm is one des-
tined to win its fight, the number and strength 
of the persuasive arguments in its favor will 
increase (p. 159). 
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Purpose of the Study 
Kuhn, after examining the resolution of several cases 
of crises, concludes that crises are terminated with a 
simultaneous decision of rejecting the old paradigm and 
accepting a new one which revolutionizes the field. But he 
explicitly notes that the act of judgment leading to that 
decision is preceded by a period of 11 extraordinary sci-
ence.11 By extraordinary science Kuhn means research 
directed at examining competing paradigms. 
Having established (using Kuhn's analysis) that cur-
riculum evaluation is in a state of crisis, and having 
identified several competing paradigms (the dominant and 
the emergents) in this field, the next step is to engage in 
''extraordinary science 11 research. 
One of the basic purposes of this study is to examine 
select philosophical, conceptual, and methodological 
aspects of the dominant natural science paradigm • At the 
level of philosophy, four assumptions will be considered: 
(1) the nature of real.ity, (2) the nature of subject-object 
relationships, (3) the nature of truth statements, and (4) 
the nature of value judgments. At the conceptual level, 
this study will seek answers to two fundamental questions: 
(1) How does this paradigm conceptualize the curriculum 
being evaluated: and (2) What model(s) does it provide for 
evaluating the curriculum? The methodological examination 
will be concerned with the fundamental techniques of data 
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collection, design, and analysis that this dominant 
paradigm provides for curriculum evaluation 
As a second purpose, this study will examine one of 
the emergent alternatives--the aesthetic paradigm. It is 
hoped that this examination will provide the stimulus for 
researching the other candidates for paradigm, i.e., the 
legal and the anthropological. 
The paradigm concept has received considerable atten-
tion in the literature since the first publication of 
Kuhn's study in 1962. This concept is used to refer to a 
particular "Weltanschauung ... This term comes from the 
German language and is translated to English as "world 
view." World view, in turn, is defined as a "comprehensive 
conception or apprehension of the world" (Webster's New 
Collegiate Dictionary, 1979, p. 1321). Several analyses of 
the structure of paradigms reinforce Kuhn's basic notion 
that a paradigm contains not only a philosophy but also a 
linkage to certain theories and methods. This study of 
paradigms incorporates that notion. 
Organization of the Study 
This study is organized into five chapters. Chapter I 
has provided its introductory part. This introduction con-
tains an assessment (using Kuhn's analysis of crisis) of 
the present state of the field of curriculum evaluation and 
the purpose of the study. The remaining chapters are orga-
nized as follows: 
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Chapter II includes a description of the distinctive 
features of the dominant natural science paradigm, an exam-
ination of the concept of curriculum and the evaluation 
process as developed in the context of this paradigm, and a 
discussion of the most prominent evaluation techniques of 
data gathering, design, and analysis used by practitioners 
of this paradigm. 
Chapter III provides a discussion of the philosophical 
world view of the dominant natural science paradigm. This 
discussion focuses on the four sets of assumptions previ-
ously indicated, i.e., the nature of reality, the nature of 
subject-object relationships, the nature of truth state-
ments, and the nature of value judgments. 
Chapter IV contains the examination of the aesthetic 
paradigm. This examination is intended to bring to focus 
the paradigm's new ideas concerning the curriculum, the 
evaluation process, and the methods of evaluation. It is 
also concerned with identifying the paradigm's philosophi-
cal orientation. 
Chapter V contains a brief discussion of some of the 
implications of accepting the aesthetic paradigm in 
curriculum evaluation, a statement of the conclusions of 
this study and recommendations for further studies. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE FRAMEWORK OF THE DOMINANT PARADIGM 
Distinctive Features 
As pointed out in the first chapter, the field of cur-
riculum evaluation is dominated by the natural science 
paradigm. The notion of paradigm was defined as a world 
view, and it was also suggested that the dominant world 
view comes from the positivist tradition. In general, the 
positivist view (discussed more fully in Chapter III) con-
ceives the world as an objective reality which is known to 
us through sense-experience and verified by natural science 
methods. This world view considers theology and meta-
physics as primitive ways of viewing the world. The term 
"natural science" is used here to refer to "any of the sci-
ences (as physics, chemistry, or biology) that deal with 
matter, energy, and their interrelations and transforma-
tions" (Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary, 1979, p. 759). 
The application of the dominant natural science 
paradigm is distinguished by two major features: the use of 
the scientific method, and the quantification of observa-
tions. 
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The Scientific Method 
Originally, the scientific method was based on Aris-
totelian deductive logic. This type of logic utilizes the 
categorical syllogism as its basic model or reasoning. 
Syllogistic reasoning establishes a logical connection 
between three propositions; that is, a major premise, a 
minor premise, and a conclusion. A major premise is a 
self-evident truth or a general axiom. A minor premise is 
a particular case related to the major premise. A conclu-
sion is the logical consequence of the established rela-
tionship of the two premises. With the dominance of posi-
tivism, Aristotelian logic has been replaced by the logical 
method of analysis (symbolic logic) developed by the 
English mathematicians/philosophers Bertrand Russell (1872-
1970) and Alfred North Whitehead (1861-1947). 
Symbolic logic, like Aristotelian logic, is a deduc-
tive method of analysis; that is, it moves from the general 
to the specific. Unlike Aristotelian logic, it incorpo-
rates hypothetical reasoning. In addition, symbolic logic 
submits the propositions to a "process of reductionism" on 
which they are operationalized to their immediately observ-
able content (Culbertson, 1981, p. 33). According to the 
positivists, symbolic logic is superior to Aristotelian 
logic. This position is best expressed by Kraft (1983), 
when he states: 
The new logic, symbolic logic, is far superior to 
traditional logic, both in terms of content and 
in terms of form. It not only contains a larger 
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number of essential disciplines, but even the old 
disciplines are treated with greater rigor and 
more systematically. And with the help of sym-
bolism a form of representation has been found 
which enables mathematically precise formulations 
of concepts and propositions and rules governing 
the latter's combination. Thus, it becomes pos-
sible to operate in a purely formal manner .•• 
Equivocations are avoided, unnoticed assumptions 
are revealed, rigorous deduction is guaranteed 
(p. 18). 
The application of the scientific method involves 
three fundamental steps: deduction, verification, and gen-
eralization. Deduction, as noted above, is the process of 
logical derivation of propositions from generalizations. 
These logical propositions are then formulated in terms of 
hypothetical or observational statements. Verification 
consists of designing and performing laboratory experiments 
to confirm (or disconfirm) those hypotheses. As Guba notes 
(1978), the purpose of this step is "to rid the field of 
certain variables not of interest but having possible 
effects which would produce erroneous results" (p. 12). 
Guba also points out that in evaluation, since laboratory 
controls are more difficult to handle, practitioners of the 
scientific method often find recourse in the strategy of 
randomization. He states: 
In the physical sciences it is always possible to 
effect physical control over such confounding 
variables, but control is far more difficult to 
manage in dealing with human behavior. Here the 
investigator must resort to a randomization 
strategy which, while not eliminating the 
confounding variables, at least permits him to 
estimate their size through statistical processes 
(p. 12). 
The final step, generalization, involves the act of infer-
ring from experimental data law-like explanations that can 
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"provide dependable bases" for predicting and controlling 
the phenomenon under investigation (Guba and Lincoln, 1983, 
p. 319). Generalization rests on the assumption of the 
"lawfulness of nature," which states that "the closer two 
events are in time, space, and measured value on any or all 
dimensions, the more they tend to follow the same laws" 
(Campbell and stanley, 1963, p. 17). 
The search for generalizations is said to be the cen-
tral interest of the scientific method in particular and 
the dominant paradigm in general. 
The dominant paradigm is directed at producing 
generalizations. The assumption that this is the 
goal of Science is so deeply ingrained that it is 
virtually true by definition. I have never seen 
this assumption questioned in the literature of 
Scientific Methodology. Science is the search 
for generalizations (Patton, 1975, p. 35). 
In fact, Eisner (1983) traces the present dominance of the 
natural science paradigm to the strong aspiration of ear-
lier educational scientists, especially behavioral psychol-
ogists, to discover the "laws of learning" that would pre-
diet and control the outcomes of the school curriculum. 
Such an aspiration, Eisner notes, wasjis reflected on the 
emphasis on efficiency and effectiveness in the schools. 
He expresses: 
Laws that would do for educational practitioners 
what the work of Einstein, Maxwell, and Bohr have 
done for physicists were the object of the educa-
tional scientist's dream. This yearning for pre-
diction through control was, of course, reflected 
in the desire to make schools more efficient and, 
presumably, more effective .... This aspiration to 
discover the laws of learning was allied with the 
scientific management movement in education •.• It 
reflected then, as it does today, the need to 
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discover the principles and practices that would 
give us efficient and effective schools (pp. 335-
336) • 
Further, he asserts that this search for the laws of learn-
ing has produced three significant consequences: the objec-
tification of the educational practice, the oversimplifica-
tion of the educational process, and the de-emotionaliza-
tion of the language for talking about children, teaching, 
and educational priorities. 
Several evaluation theorists argue that in evaluation 
it is impossible to generalize in the scientific sense. 
For example, Cronbach (1975), after examining 20 years of 
evaluative research, concludes that generalizations are 
like radioactive substances; that is, they decay and have 
half-lives. 
Generalizations decay. At one time a conclusion 
describes the existing situation well, at a later 
time it accounts for rather little variance, and 
ultimately is valid only as history (p. 122). 
Cronbach counsels practitioners to place emphasis on 
describing and interpreting particular situations rather 
than viewing generalization as the aim of inquiry. He 
expresses: 
Instead of making generalization the ruling 
consideration ... ! suggest that we reverse our 
priorities. An observer collecting data in a 
particular situation is in a position to appraise 
a practice or proposition in that setting, 
observing effects in context •.•. As he goes from 
situation to situation, his first task is to 
describe and interpret the effect anew in each 
locale, perhaps taking into account factors 
unique to that locale or series of events ..•• 
When we give proper weight to local conditions, 
any generalization is a working hypothesis, not 
a conclusion (pp. 125-125). 
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Similar advice is given by Guba (1978) to the naturalistic 
evaluator: 
Often naturalistic inquiry can establish at least 
the 'limiting cases' relevant to a given situa-
tion. But in the spirit of naturalistic inquiry 
he should regard each possible generalization 
only as a working hypothesis to be tested again 
in the next encounter and again in the encounter 
after that. For the N/I evaluator premature clo-
sure is a cardinal sin, and tolerance of ambigu-
ity is a virtue (p. 70). 
Patton (1980) proposes the "inductive" approach for 
"grounding" generalizations on the data. He distinguishes 
this approach as follows: 
••• an inductive approach to evaluation research 
means that an understanding of program activities 
and outcomes emerge from experience with the pro-
gram. Theories about what is happening in a 
program are grounded in this program experience, 
rather than imposed on the program a priori based 
on hypothetico-deductive constructions (p. 41). 
But, for the dominant natural science paradigm, the scien-
tific method is the superior mode of arriving at general-
izations. This is clearly evident in Durant's (1961) syn-
thesis of Comte•s positivist Law of Three Stages: 
In each field of thought the historian of ideas 
could observe a Law of Three stages: at first the 
subject was conceived in the theological fashion, 
and all problems were explained by the will of 
some deity--as when the stars were gods, or the 
chariots of gods: later, the same subject reached 
the metaphysical stage, and was explained by 
metaphysical abstractions--as when the stars 
moved in circles because circles were the most 
perfect figure; finally the subject was reduced 
to positive science by precise observation, 
hypothesis, and experiment, and its phenomena 
were explained through the regularities of natu-
ral cause and effect (p. 352) • 
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Quantification 
The dominant paradigm demands that any observation 
concerning the "qualities" of the object of investigation 
be expressed in quantitative terms. According to Gay 
(1980), quantification provides at least four advantages: 
It (1) permits a more precise and objective description 
concerning qualities, (2) reduces ambiguity considerably, 
(3) supplies much more information than the verbal state-
ment, and (4) facilitates comparisons. For quantifying 
observations, the paradigm relies upon the use of measuring 
instruments which provide a "standardized framework" on 
which observations are "fit into" via the assignment of 
"numerical values" (cf. Patton, 1980, p. 22). In curricu-
lum evaluation, the "test" is the preferred measuring 
instrument. 
In methodological discussions, opponents of quantifi-
cation argue that in the translation of observations to 
numbers valuable information is not only destroyed but is 
altered to fit into the standardized categories. Regarding 
the latter, Eisner (1985b) observes: 
The quantitative inquirer is obliged to transform 
the qualities perceived into quantitative 
terms .•• In this translation the information is 
altered; differences between qualities are placed 
on a common scale to make them comparable. This 
process requires the use of a coding system--
number--that is not structurally analogous to the 
forms that were initially perceived. The number 
symbol is a representational rather than a pre-
sentational symbol (p. 238}. 
Eisner goes on to identify poetry and literature as two of 
the modes that employ "structurally analogous" forms; that 
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is, presentational symbols. It is also argued that when 
the object of investigation is the human subject there are 
certain qualities, e.g., motivation or interest, which are 
not amenable to quantification. Quantitative thinkers 
maintain that theoretically all qualities can be quanti-
fied. The following argument is frequently used to support 
their position: "If something exists, it exists in quanti-
ties, or amounts; if it exists in quantities, it can be 
measured" (Gay, 1980, p 9). 
Patton (1975) observes that nonquantitative approaches 
to evaluation frequently stimulate charges of 
"subjectivity." Nonquantitative evaluators are exhorted to 
eschew subjectivity and make sure that their evaluations 
are objective. Objective evaluations are considered to be 
the only kind of studies worthy of federal support. Sub-
jective evaluations, as he notes, are regarded as unscien-
tific. 
To be subjective means to be biased, unreliable, 
and non-rational. Subjective data imply opinion 
rather than fact, intuition rather than logic, 
impression rather than confirmation (p. 21). 
Patton maintains that subjectivity properly construed can 
become a positive rather than a pejorative term in evalua-
tion. Subjectivity allows the evaluator to get close and 
involved with the data, thereby developing categories from 
the data itself. He asserts that to identify objectivity 
as a virtue of quantification is an ideological statement 
which functions to preserve and protect its dominance in 
evaluation. Dominance which needs to be maintained, as 
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Patton suggests, since quantitative methodologists rank at 
the top of the methodological status hierarchy. In this 
particular, he states: 
The art and science of quantification constitutes 
the very core of the dominant paradigm. To turn 
words into numbers, historical trends into pre-
diction equations, and the behavior of people 
into probability tables and standardized regres-
sions--those are the greatest miracles in Sci-
ence, and to the performers of these miracles go 
the greatest of all scientific rewards: recog-
nition and high status (p. 12). 
Patton then argues that the dominance of quantifica-
tion works in practice to severely limit the kinds of ques-
tions to be asked and the types of problems to be studied. 
Preferred Conceptions of the Curriculum 
The evaluation of the curriculum usually involves 
internal and external assessments of effectiveness. Inter-
nally, evaluation assesses the degree to which the curricu-
lum has achieved its intended outcomes. Externally, evalu-
ation assesses the effects of the curriculum on student 
achievement. It seems evident that the dominant framework 
prefers a specific conception of the curriculum for each 
type of assessment. For example, internal evaluation tends 
to incorporate a product conception of the curriculum, 
while external evaluation conceives the curriculum as a 
treatment. 
Curriculum as a Product 
The product conception of the curriculum can be noted, 
for instance, in the tendency of practitioners to use the 
terms "curriculum" and "product" as synonymous when defin-
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ing evaluation-related concepts. Unruh and Unruh's (1984) 
definition of formative evaluation illustrates this 
tendency: 
•.• formative evaluation refers to the collection 
of appropriate evidence during the construction 
and trial of a new curriculum so that revisions 
of the curriculum can be based on this evidence. 
formative evaluation is almost exclusively aimed 
at improving the •.• product during its develop-
mental phases (p. 273). 
Similarly, Zais (1976), in defining summative evaluation, 
refers to the curriculum as a product: 
Summative evaluation, as its name implies, 
is conducted in order to obtain a comprehensive 
assessment of the quality of a completed curricu-
lum. Thus, summative evaluation ordinarily takes 
place at the completion of the curriculum devel-
opment process and provides a terminal judgment 
on the completed product in overall, general 
terms (p. 381). 
This product view of the curriculum stems from the 
scientific-management movement of the early 1900s that 
sought to install industrial practices in the schools. 
A leading figure of the movement, Franklin Bobbitt, delin-
eated a production model for curriculum-thinking based on 
the notion of efficiency as espoused by the founder of 
scientific management, the industrial psychologist Freder-
ick w. Taylor. In Bobbitt's (1935) model, the curriculum 
consisted of four basic ingredients: (1) a statement of 
objectives, (2) a sequence of experiences shown by analysis 
to be reasonably uniform in value in achieving the objec-
tives, (3) subject matter found to be reasonably uniform as 
the best means of engaging in the experiences, and (4) 
statements of immediate outcomes of achievements to be 
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derived from the experiences (p. 163). This product was to 
be refined by evaluation before placing it in the market. 
Huebner (1975) puts it this way: 
Evaluation ... may be considered a type of quality 
control. The end product is scrutinized to see 
if it can go to the market with the stamp of 
approval; or if not yet at the end of the produc-
tion line, the inadequate products-in-process are 
shunted aside to be reworked by remedial efforts 
until they can return to the normal production 
1 ine ( p . 2 2 3 ) . 
This product view of curriculum was later recaptured 
by Ralph W. Tyler in his syllabus Basic Principles of Cur-
riculum and Instruction (1949), widely known as the Tyler 
rationale. This rationale, as Kliebard (1978) observes, 
has been "raised almost to the status of revealed doctrine" 
(p. 256). 
Tyler's rationale revolves around four basic questions 
that he feels need to be answered in developing a curricu-
lum. These questions are as follows: 
1. What educational purposes should the school seek 
to attain? 
2. What educational experiences can be provided that 
are likely to attain these purposes? 
3. How can these educational experiences be effec-
tively organized? 
4. How can we determine whether these purposes are 
being attained? 
These questions may be reformulated into the familiar four-
step process by which a curriculum is developed: stating 
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objectives, selecting experiences, organizing experiences, 
and evaluating. 
According to Tyler (1949), the most crucial step in 
developing a curriculum is to answer the first question 
since all the others proceed from this step. As he puts 
it, "If we are to study an educational program systemati-
cally and intelligently we must first be sure as to the 
educational objectives aimed at" (p. 3). He contends that 
the most useful way to state educational objectives is by 
expressing them in behavioral terms. These objectives also 
become the criteria by which the means to accomplish the 
purposes are selected, e.g., teaching materials, content, 
instructional procedures, and evaluation instruments. 
Curriculum Controversy. The inclusion of educational 
or learning "experiences" in the curriculum has generated 
much discussion in the curriculum field. It is argued that 
the statement of specific objectives is what the curriculum 
is all about. Anything else, e.g., learning experiences, 
belongs to the realm of instruction. In a widely debated 
essay, Johnson (1967) points out that "there is •.• no expe-
rience until an interaction between the individual and his 
environment actually occurs. Clearly, such interaction 
characterizes instruction, not curriculum" (p. 44). He 
argues that if curriculum must play any role in instruc-
tion, it must be viewed as "anticipatory" not "reportorial" 
(p. 44). In this regard, he states: 
Curriculum prescribes (or at least anticipates) 
the results of instruction. It does not pre-
scribe the means ... to be used in achieving the 
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results. In specifying outcomes to be sought, 
curriculum is concerned with ends, but at the 
level of attainable learning products, not at the 
more remote level at which these ends are justi-
fied (p. 44) 
He goes on to define the curriculum as "a structured series 
of intended learning outcomes" (p. 44). By a "structured 
series" he means that the curriculum indicates organiza-
tional relationships among the "intended outcomes." These 
intended outcomes, he argues, need to be selected from the 
available, teachable cultural content (p. 45). 
MacDonald (1965), however, contends that the curricu-
lum is not an isolated element in the school system. He 
views the curriculum as interacting not only with instruc-
tion but also with teaching and learning. He presents a 
systems model of curriculum showing this interaction 
(Figure 1). In his model, teaching is defined as a person-
ality system (the teacher) acting in a professional role. 
Learning is another personality system (the student) who is 
perceived by the teacher as performing task-oriented activ-
ities. Instruction is the combination of these two person-
ality systems, which also may be thought of as the "action 
context" within which formal teaching and learning take 
place. This combination, according to MacDonald, eventu-
ates in a social system. The curriculum is also a social 
system. This social system consists of those individuals 
whose actions eventuate in "a curriculum." He then defines 
"a curriculum" as essentially a plan for action; that is, a 
plan which guides instruction (1965, p. 6). 
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Source: J. B. MacDonald. Educational models for instruction. 
In J. B. MacDonald and R. R. Leeper (Eds.), Theories 
of Instruction, 1965. 















Source: M. Johnson. Definitions and models in curriculum theory, 
Educational Theory, 1967. 
Figure 2. Johnson's System Model of Curriculum 
..,. 
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In response to MacDonald's contention, Johnson (1967) 
argues that the curriculum is not a system itself but the 
output of one system (the curriculum development system) 
and an input into another system (the instructional sys-
tem) . He also supports his argument with a system model of 
curriculum (Figure 2) . Johnson also claims that curriculum 
evaluation is too often confounded with instructional eval-
uation. According to him, curriculum evaluation involves 
validation of the selection and the structure of the cur-
riculum. The curriculum serves as the criterion for 
instructional evaluation, which occurs at the output point 
of instruction. In contrast, instructional evaluation 
involves a comparison of actual and intended learning out-
comes in order to provide evidence of the effectiveness of 
learning but not of the curriculum. 
In another work, Johnson (1978) attempts to demon-
strate that curriculum development is a process and the 
curriculum its product. He further states that instruc-
tional planning, while also a process, results in the 
instructional plan or program. He argues that little 
progress can be made in curriculum unless such a distinc-
tion be maintained. 
Curriculum as a Treatment 
As previously indicated, external evaluation concep-
tualizes the curriculum as a treatment in order to evaluate 
its effects. This conception brings the assumption that a 
curriculum, once introduced into the evaluation situation, 
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remains relatively stable over long periods of time (Guba, 
1978; Patton, 1980). Furthermore, this conception assumes 
that the curriculum is a causal agent whose effects on stu-
dents' achievement can be certainly predicted and objec-
tively observed (i.e., as measured by posttesting). Under-
lying this assumption is the paradigm's notion of 
"causality" which affirms that all phenomena "can be 
explained as the result (effect) of a cause that precedes 
the effect temporally or simultaneously with it" (Guba, 
1983, p. 7). In A System of Logic Mill (1873) provides the 
logical procedure for establishing causality in controlled 
situations: 
If an instance in which the phenomenon under 
investigation occurs, and an instance in which it 
does not occur have every circumstance in common 
save one, that one occurring only in the former, 
the circumstance in which alone the two instances 
differ is the effect, or the cause, or an indis-
pensable part of the cause of the phenomenon 
(p. 222). 
This notion of causality has its origins in Aristo-
tle's deterministic conception of the world. Aristotle 
conceives the world as an orderly whole where everything 
moves naturally toward a predetermined end. Events, 
according to him, are not haphazard or accidental but 
causally determined. He identifies four fundamental causes 
that determine an event: formal, material, efficient, and 
final (Riestra, 1970). Of these four causes, the final 
cause is the most important for Aristotle, as explained by 
Durant (1961): 
Of the varied causes which determine an event, 
the final cause, which determines the purpose, is 
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the most decisive and important. The mistakes 
and futilities of nature are due to the inertia 
of matter resisting the forming force of purpose-
-hence the abortions and monsters that mar the 
panorama of life ..• everything is guided in a cer-
tain direction •.. the egg of the hen is internally 
designed or destined to become not a duck but a 
chick; the acorn becomes not a willow but an oak 
(p. 70) • 
Durant continues to explain that God is Aristotle's final 
cause: 
He is the final cause of nature, the drive and 
purpose of things, the form of the world; the 
principle of its life; the sum of its vital pro-
cesses and powers; the inherent goal of its 
growth; the energizing entelechy of the whole. 
He is pure energy ... He is not so much a person as 
a magnetic power (p. 71). 
He further observes that this determinism is also central 
in Aristotle's philosophical psychology. According to 
Aristotle, "We cannot directly will to be different from 
what we are" {Durant, 1961, p. 72). 
The adequacy of the paradigm's notion of causality for 
investigating physical phenomena has been challenged by 
Heissenberg's conception of the "uncertainty principle." 
This principle states that: 
••• it is impossible to assert in terms of the 
ordinary conventions of geometrical position and 
of motion that a particle (as an electron) is at 
the same time at a specific point and moving with 
a specified velocity (Webster's New Collegiate 
Dictionary, 1979, p. 1263). 
This implies that we can never predict with certainty cause 
and effect relationships. Tranel (1981), in his article "A 
Lesson from the Physicists," argues that if the widely 
accepted notion of causality seems to be inapplicable in 
the "world of material substances, it is all the more inap-
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propriate and misleading in the world of the individual, 
where measurement and predictability are inherently pre-
eluded" (p. 425). Similarly, Dobson, Dobson, and Koetting 
(1985), after illustrating the inapplicability of this 
notion of causality in the more measurement-oriented social 
sciences, express: 
If the model is not applicable in those social 
sciences that lend themselves to exactness, why 
have educators become so infatuated with the 
power of the cause-effect concept in the study of 
children? The ultimate thrust of the cause-
effect model is prediction and control; emancipa-
tion and understanding are secondary concerns (p. 
7) • 
They suggest the need for alternative concepts in the study 
of children in order "to enhance their educational living 
experiences" (p. 9) • They personally support the view that 
new concepts "can be derived from aesthetic and ethical 
value systems" (p. 9). 
Supporters of the prevalent conception of causality 
claim that cause and effect relationships can be "truly" 
established through the application of the "experimental 
method." 
The Experimental Method. Basically, the experimental 
method consists of designing situations for observation in 
which the treatment is manipulated and extraneous variables 
are controlled. 
Manipulation of the treatment means that the evaluator 
decides in advance the forms that the treatment will take 
and who will get which form (Gay, 1980). The different 
forms that the treatment may take are essentially presence 
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versus absence (treatment versus nontreatment), or presence 
of the treatment under consideration versus presence of a 
different treatment (e.g., treatment A versus treatment B). 
The application of the experimental method, typically, 
involves two groups, the treatment group, and the control 
group. The treatment group is exposed to the treatment 
under consideration, while the control group receives 
either the nontreatment form or the different treatment. 
Both groups are equated on all variables except the treat-
ment variable. 
The term "extraneous variables" is used to refer to 
those conditions not manipulated by the evaluator which 
might produce effects confounded with the effects of the 
treatment. Control refers to efforts to remove, or account 
for, the effects of extraneous variables. Uncontrolled 
extraneous variables are viewed as potential threats to the 
internal and external validity of the experiment. Internal 
validity refers to the condition that observed effects are 
a direct result of the manipulation of the treatment, not 
to some other factor; while external validity refers to the 
condition that results are generalizable or applicable to 
other situations. 
Campbell and Stanley (1963) identify twelve classes of 
extraneous variables. These extraneous variables represent 
the effects of: 
1. History - refers to the occurrence of any 
event that is not part of the evaluation 
situation. 
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2. Maturation - refers to developmental changes 
within the subjects. 
3. Testing - refers to improved scores on a 
posttest resulting from subjects having 
taken a pretest. 
4. Instrumentation - refers to changes in the 
calibration of evaluation instruments. 
5. Statistical Regression - refers to the 
tendency of high scores to decrease toward 
the mean, or the tendency of low scores to 
increase toward the mean. 
6. Differential Selection - refers to initial 
differences of the groups. 
7. Mortality- refers to the drop out of 
subjects from the evaluation study. 
8. Selection-Maturation Interaction - refers to 
the interaction of the initial differences 
and developmental changes. 
9. Reactive Effects of Testing - refers to the 
subjects• sensitivity to the treatment as a 
result of the pretest. 
10. Reactive Arrangements - refers to factors 
associated with the implementation of the 
treatment and the feelings and attitudes of 
participants. 
11. Selection Treatment Interaction - refers to 
the possibility that the treatment and 
control groups are initially different. 
12. Multiple-Treatment Interference - refers to 
the effects of prior treatments applied to 
the same subjects (pp. 5-6). 
For controlling these extraneous variables, they strongly 
recommend the technique of randomization. This technique 
basically consists of selecting groups' participants or 
assigning the treatment by pure chance. It is based upon 
the assumption that through random selection and assignment 
differences between the treatment and control groups result 
only from the operation of probability or chance. These 
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differences are known as "sampling error" or "error vari-
ance," and their magnitude can be estimated through statis-
tical techniques. If the difference between the perfor-
mance of the treatment and control groups is too great to 
attribute to error variance, then it is presumed that the 
difference is probably due to the intervention of the 
treatment. Randomization is usually accomplished by flip-
ping a coin, tossing a die, or using a table of a random 
numbers. 
Curriculum Evaluation Models 
The first formal application of the dominant paradigm 
in the evaluation of the curriculum may be credited to the 
physician/psychologist Joseph M. Rice. Rice (1897) evalu-
ated scientifically the spelling curricula of 21 school 
districts in order to "prove" that the first step toward 
placing the elementary curriculum on a scientific basis 
must necessarily lie on predicting its learning outcomes. 
Rice measured the spelling achievement of 33,000 students 
using standardized tests. 
Rice's work was furthered by the behavioral psycholo-
gist Edward L. Thorndike (DuBois, 1970). Thorndike recom-
mended that once those outcomes were predicted they should 
be formulated in terms of students' behaviors. According 
to Thorndike, only behavioral outcomes were reliable indi-
cators of learning (Seguel, 1966). He also recommended the 
use of behavioral outcomes as the standard for assessing 
the effectiveness of the curriculum. His recommendations 
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have been incorporated in the behavioral-objectives cur-
riculum evaluation model that now dominates the field. 
The Behavioral-Objectives Model 
The educational psychologist Ralph w. Tyler, combining 
Thorndike's ideas, his rationale for developing achievement 
tests, and the product conception of the curriculum, formu-
lated this model within the context of the Eight-Year study 
(1933-1941). His model defines behavioral objectives as 
those specified behaviors to be exhibited by the student 
after a given period of instruction. A well-formulated 
behavioral objective, according to Tyler (1942), also 
includes the kind of situation in which those behaviors are 
to be elicited. Further elaborations of the concept of 
behavioral objectives (e.g., Mager, 1962; Vargas, 1972) 
include the notion of standard of performance. As Zais 
(1976) notes, the principle of operationalism comprises the 
theoretical base for the idea of behaviorizing educational 
objectives. He states: 
••• behavioral objectives are fundamentally nei-
ther new nor a creation of the educational estab-
lishment. The theoretical basis and much of the 
substance of behavioral objectives have been bor-
rowed from physics and other disciplines of the 
scientific community from a long-established con-
cept called "operationalism" (p. 311). 
Zais goes on to define operationalism as the "process of 
consciously specifying those unambiguous observable indices 
that we agree imply the existence of the construct we wish 
to identify" (p. 312). 
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The basic purpose of evaluation, according to Tyler 
(1949), is to determine whether behavioral objectives have 
been achieved. He explains it best when he states: 
The process of evaluation is essentially the pro-
cess of determining to what extent the educa-
tional objectives are actually being realized by 
the program of curriculum and instruction. How-
ever, since educational objectives are essen-
tially changes in human beings, that is, the 
objectives aimed at to produce certain desirable 
changes in the behavior patterns of the student, 
then evaluation is the process for determining 
the degree to which these changes in behavior are 
actually taking place (pp. 105-106). 
Tyler's evaluation procedure may be outlined as follows: 
1. Derive curriculum objectives from three 
sources of data: (a) studies of the needs 
and interests of the learners, (b) studies of 
the society, and (c) reports of subject-
matter experts. 
2. Select those objectives that are consistent 
with the school philosophy and the psychology 
of learning. 
3. Define those objectives in terms of 
measurable observable behaviors. 
4. Identify situations in which the students can 
express the behaviors stipulated in the 
objectives. 
5. Select or develop objective, reliable, and 
valid evaluation instruments. 
6. Collect pre and posttest performance data 
relative to the objectives. 
7. Determine the degree of congruence between 
these two sets of data. If a congruency 
between these two sets of data is found, then 
the curriculum is effective in meeting its 
purposes; that is, in changing the behavior 
patterns of students. 
In his previous work, Tyler (1942) mentions at least 
three uses of the evaluation data: (1) for inferring 
hypothesis that can explain the weaknesses and strengths of 
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the curriculum, (2) for validating the underlying assump-
tions of the curriculum and (3) for deducing general prin-
ciples that may provide an improved basis for guiding 
future curricular efforts. 
Many curriculum evaluation scholars have furthered the 
work of Tyler by developing variations of his behavioral-
objectives model. A few of them are Hammond (1973), 
Metfessel and Michael (1967), and Provus (1972). There 
are, however, others who have dissented from the Tyler 
model, and have proposed alternative conceptualizations, 
still within the dominant paradigm. Prominent among these 
alternatives are the Countenance, the CIPP, and the Goal-
Free evaluation models. These three models are discussed 
below. 
The Countenance Model 
This model has been proposed by Stake (1967) as an 
alternative of what he considers to be the three major lim-
itations of the Tylerian model: (1) the oversimplification 
of curriculum objectives, (2) the lack of concern for the 
teaching-learning process, and (3) the omission of judgmen-
tal data. Stake's Countenance model calls for attending to 
three phases of the curriculum: antecedents, transactions, 
and outcomes. Antecedents are the conditions prior to the 
teaching-learning process that may influence this process 
and, by implication, the outcomes. Transactions are 
defined as the "successions of engagements" that constitute 
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the teaching-learning process. outcomes are considered to 
be the effects of the curriculum. 
According to Stake, the general act of evaluation 
involves completing two data matrices: the description 
matrix, and the judgment matrix (Figure 3). Each matrix is 
divided into two columns, intents and observations for the 
description matrix, and standards and judgments for the 
judgment matrix. Both matrices are divided into three 
rows: antecedents, transactions, and outcomes. Basically, 
the process of evaluation involves the following steps: 
1. Formulate intents for the antecedents, 
transactions, and outcomes. 
2. Justify the intents in terms of some explicit 
rationale. 
3. Set the standards for antecedents, 
transactions, and outcomes. 
4. Collect data for the observations column of 
the description matrix. 
5. Check the congruence between intents and 
observations data. 
6. Check the discrepancies between these two 
sets of data against the standards. 
7. Interpret the discrepancies. 
8. Judge the merit of the curriculum. 
In his countenance model, Stake suggests that evalu-
ation should be systematic and scientific. Recently, stake 
(1983) has moved away from the dominant natural science 
paradigm. 
Several analyses of the Countenance model acknowledge 
its tremendous contributions to the concept of evaluation. 
As Guba and Lincoln (1981) note, this model has been the 
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Source: R. Stake. The countenance of educational evaluation, 
Teachers College Record, 1967. 
Figure 3. Statements and Data to be Collected by the Evaluator 
in the Countenance Model 
U1 
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first to conceive the complete act of evaluation as involv-
ing both descriptions and judgments. However, the model 
has been severely criticized as inoperative (Lewy, 1973, 
1977; Westbury, 1969). 
The CIPP Model 
The CIPP (Context-Input-Process-Product) model defines 
evaluation as "a process of delineating, obtaining, and 
providing useful information for judging decision alterna-
tives" (Stufflebeam, 1973, p. 121). It focuses on four 
types of curricular decisions: (1) planning decisions, (2) 
structuring decisions, (3) implementing decisions, and (4) 
recycling decisions (Figure 4). Planning decisions are 
made to determine the intended-ends (goals) • Structuring 
decisions are for the purposes of designing the intended-
means (curriculum design). Implementing decisions are made 
on actual-means (the implemented curriculum) and recycling 
decisions are for the purpose of judging and reacting to 
actual-ends (curriculum attainments). Corresponding to the 
four types of decisions are four kinds of evaluation: (1) 
context evaluation, (2) input evaluation, (3) process eval-
uation, and (4) product evaluation. 
Context evaluation serves the planning decisions by 
providing information relevant to the environment. Specif-
ically, it provides information about unmet needs, unused 
opportunities, and desires and actual conditions. This 
kind of evaluation begins with a conceptual analysis in 
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served by the evaluation. Its basic purpose is to provide 
a rationale for the planning decisions, i.e., the goals of 
the curriculum. 
Input evaluation serves the structuring decisions. It 
assesses the curriculum design in terms of time, cost, con-
straints, relevance. Its intention is to provide an over-
all estimate of the potential of the design to meet the 
goals. 
Process evaluation provides periodic feedback to cur-
riculum implementers. This kind of evaluation has three 
specific purposes. First, to detect defects in the design. 
Second, to provide information for programmed decisions. 
And third, to maintain a record of the actual implementa-
tion. In general, process evaluation assists developers in 
making decisions for the modification and the improvement 
of the curriculum. 
Product evaluation determines the overall effective-
ness of the implemented curriculum. It is determined by 
relating the outcome information to the goals, and to the 
context, input, and process information. The purpose of 
product evaluation is to provide information for making 
decisions about the continuation, termination, or modifica-
tion of the curriculum. 
Stufflebeam (1973) provides a logical framework for 
designing a CIPP evaluation: 
1. focusing the evaluation 
2. collection of information 
3. organization of information 
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4. analysis of information 
5. reporting of information 
6. administration of evaluation 
He claims that the CIPP evaluation model has the potential 
for providing information that is valid, reliable, credi-
ble, timely, and pervasive. Like the Countenance model, 
the CIPP evaluation model has been criticized as difficult 
to operationalize (Lewy, 1973). In addition, it is argued 
that the CIPP model is highly expensive (Worthen and 
Sanders, 1973). 
The Goal-Free Model 
The Goal-Free evaluation (GFE) model has been concep-
tualized by Michael Scriven. Scriven (1974) maintains that 
the evaluator's knowledge of the goals intended to be 
achieved by a curriculum, which he calls the "rhetoric of 
intent" of the Tylerian approach, is a contaminated step in 
the evaluation process. He has arrived at this conclusion 
after experiencing many cases on which a curriculum had 
been judged as ineffective in achieving the intended goals 
while it had been rated high on the so-called "side 
effects" or unintended goals. In order to avoid contami-
nating the evaluation with the rhetoric of intent, Scriven 
proposes the use of the GFE approach. In GFE, the evalua-
tor searches for all effects of the curriculum. There are 
no side effects to examine since data about all effects, 
and not only the intended effects, are of primary concern. 
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This type of evaluation is, according to Scriven, similar 
to Consumers' Union procedures: 
It seemed to me, in short, that a consideration 
and evaluation of goals was an unnecessary but 
also a possibly contaminating step. I began to 
work on an alternative approach--simply, the 
evaluation of actual effects against (typically) 
a profile of demonstrated needs in this region of 
education. (This is close to what Consumers' 
Union actually does.) I call this goal-free 
evaluation ••. (p. 35). 
The GFE model supports the idea of using external 
evaluators (i.e., independent of the curriculum development 
process) for both the formative and summative roles. It 
argues that internal or staff evaluators, since they are 
too close to the developmental activity, tend to have 
"occupational tunnel vision" with respect to the effects of 
the curriculum; that is, a tendency to look mainly in the 
direction of intended goals (Scriven, 1974, p. 36). 
This model also incorporates Scriven's (1967) early 
insistence that evaluators should not merely present infor-
mation for administrators to use in formulating judgments 
about curricula, but the evaluators should arrive at and 
publicly report their own independent evaluative judgments. 
He asserts that the evaluators' main responsibility is to 
judge the relative merit of curricula since this is the 
principal goal of evaluation. He argues that the failure 
to recognize this goal has led to the "dilution" of the 
process of evaluation. 
A recent analysis of Scriven's GFE model notes that 
although it is mainly theoretical it poses a challenge to 
the dominant position which holds that the act of evalua-
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tion cannot proceed without the statement of intended goals 
(Guba and Lincoln, 1981). 
Evaluation Methods 
Curriculum evaluation relies upon the use of quantita-
tive methods. The quantitative evaluation methodology has 
been developed to its greatest sophistication. Berk (1981) 
describes it as representing the "confluence of develop-
ments of measurement theory, research design, applied 
statistics, and computer technology" (p. 5). This section 
briefly discusses the major data collection instrument, 
required designs, and data analysis techniques. 
Major Data-Collection Instrument 
Achievement is the behavioral response most frequently 
measured in curriculum evaluations. Achievement data are 
collected via the administration of standardized achieve-
ment tests. A standardized achievement test is one that 
is: (1) constructed by measurement and subject-matter 
experts, (2) field-tested under uniform administration pro-
cedures, (3) validated to conform to the scientific crite-
ria of reliability and validity, and (4) scored and inter-
preted using standard procedures (Gay, 1980). Standardized 
achievement tests are commercially developed. They are 
available for individual curriculum areas such as reading 
and math, and also in the form of comprehensive batteries 
which measure achievement in several different areas. The 
California Achievement Test Battery, for instance, is a 
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commonly used battery which measures achievement in read-
ing, language, and arithmetic. 
The vast majority of standardized achievement tests 
are norm-referenced tests (NRTs). Standardized NRTs have 
been previously administered to groups referred to as norm 
groups. Norm groups are selected with the intention of 
having a representative group with a wide spread of scores 
with respect to achievement (score variability) • The 
scores of the norm groups are called norms, and they are 
represented in norm tables. The norms provide a standard 
of comparison and interpretation for other groups to whom 
standardized NRTs are administered. 
NRTs interpret students scores in terms of their rela-
tive position with respect to the norms. Examples of 
indices or relative position are percentile ranks, standard 
scores, grade equivalents, and normal curve equivalents. 
As Berk {1981) notes, the evaluation of federally-funded 
curricula utilizes normal curve equivalents. 
The vast majority of standardized achievement tests 
are norm-referenced tests (NRTs) . Standardized NRTs have 
been previously administered to groups referred to as norm 
groups. Norm groups are selected with the intention of 
having a representative group with a wide spread of scores 
with respect to achievement (score variability). The 
scores of the norm groups are called norms, and they are 
represented in norm tables. The norms provide a standard 
of comparison and interpretation for other groups to whom 
standardized NRTs are administered. 
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NRTs interpret students scores in terms of their rela-
tive position with respect to the norms. Examples of 
indices .or relative position are percentile ranks, standard 
scores, grade equivalents, and normal curve equivalents. 
As Berk (1981) notes, the evaluation of federally-funded 
curricula utilizes normal curve equivalents. 
Standardized NRTs are built on the assumption that 
achievement is distributed among students according to a 
Gaussian bell-shaped curve; i.e., the normal curve 
(Anastasi, 1976). Gay (1980) explains this assumption as 
follows: 
Norm-referenced standards are based on the 
assumption that measured traits involve normal 
curve properties .•.• The idea is that a measured 
trait, let us say math aptitude, exits in differ-
ent amounts in different people. Some have a lot 
of it, some have a little of it, and most have 
some amount called an 11 average 11 amount (p. 140). 
Based on this assumption, it is expected that the average 
group will obtain approximately 68% of the NRTs scores, and 
the above and below groups will contain 30% of the scores, 
that is 15% for each group. 
According to Best (1970), the concept of the normal 
curve conforms to the "law of probability 11 formulated by 
the French mathematician/astronomer Abraham DeMoivre. This 
law explains the probable occurrence of certain events, and 
describes the fluctuations or chance errors of observation 
and measurement. The concept of standard deviation (an 
index of variability) in descriptive statistics is based on 
the law of probability and it is described with reference 
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between a given number of standard deviations and the dis-
tribution of cases under the normal curve. 
Standardized NRTs are often contrasted with locally 
developed criterion referenced tests (CRTs), which are used 
in the evaluation of individual students. CRTs report and 
interpret achievement scores in terms of an absolute stan-
dard. Typically, CRTs use as their interpretative frame of 
reference a specific content domain rather than a specific 
population of students. Glasser (1963) explains the advan-
tage of CRTs as follows: 
Criterion-referenced measures indicate the con-
tent of the behavioral repertory, and the corre-
spondence between what an individual does and the 
underlying continuum of achievement. Measures 
which assess student achievement in terms of a 
criterion standard thus provide information as to 
the degree of competence attained by a particular 
student which is independent of reference to the 
performance of others (as quoted in Nitka, 1984, 
p. 10) • 
According to Baker (1969), the intention of CRTs is to min-
imize variability and to emphasize mastery. The focus in 
on what is taught. Anastasi (1976) suggests that CRTs have 
a norm-referenced base since the choice of content is based 
on normative information. She states: 
A normative framework is implicit in all 
testing, regardless of how scores are ex-
pressed .... The very choice of content or skills 
to be measured is influenced by the examiner's 
knowledge of what can be expected from human 
organisms at a particular developmental or 
instructional stage. Such a choice presupposes 
information about what other persons have done in 
similar situations. Moreover, by imposing uni-
form cut-off scores on an ability continuum, mas-
tery ... does not thereby eliminate individual dif-
ferences (p. 100). 
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In general, advocates of standardized NRTs do not view CRTs 
as being "evolved sufficiently to be considered a viable 
alternative to norm-referenced measures" (cf. Gay, 1980, p. 
158) • 
Required Designs 
Curriculum evaluation studies are based on research 
designs. There are two major classes of research designs, 
the single-variable designs and the factorial designs. The 
single-variable designs involve one treatment, which is 
intentionally varied (manipulated). These designs are cat-
egorized as pre-experimental designs, quasi-experimental 
designs, and true-experimental designs; depending upon the 
control they provide for sources of invalidity. Factorial 
designs are basically elaborations of the true experimental 
designs. The designs involve two or more treatments (at 
least one is manipulated) . They are utilized for investi-
gating the interaction of the treatments. 
The evaluation of federally-funded curricula requires 
the use of one of these three single-variable designs: (1) 
the norm-referenced design, (2) the special regression 
design, or (3) the control group design. All three designs 
use norm-referenced standardized achievement test data; 
provide an estimate of expected no-treatment posttest per-
formance; and report the results in normal curve equiva-
lents (NCEs) 
The Norm-Referenced Design. This design involves one 
group which is pretested, exposed to the treatment, and 
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posttested. Since the equivalent control group is missed, 
the norm group provides the control. Its initial proce-
dures entail: (1) establishing the average standard score 
for the group at the time of pretesting, (2) converting the 
average standard score to a percentile, and (3) transform-
ing the percentile to a normal curve equivalent (NCE) • 
This NCE is taken as the expected no-treatment posttest 
performance. It is assumed that the expected NCE would 
remain stable over time without the treatment intervention. 
In order to determine the effectiveness of the treatment, 
the actual NCE of the treatment group is compared to the 
expected NCE. The treatment is judged to be effective if a 
significant difference between the two NCEs is found. By 
contrast, if no difference is found between the actual NCE 
and the expected NCE, the treatment is said to be ineffec-
tive; that is, the students performed as would be expected 
without the treatment intervention. 
The norm-referenced design is a pre-experimental 
design. As the literature on research designs suggests, 
this type of design does not guarantee that the treatment 
accounts for the posttest differences. Campbell and Stan-
ley (1963), for instance, identify at least five non-con-
trolled variables that may provide rival explanations for 
the differences: (1) history, (2) maturation, (3) testing, 
(4) instrumentation, and (5) statistical regression. They 
maintain that the only way to insure that a treatment makes 
the difference is through the application of true experi-
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mental designs since such designs control for almost all 
sources of invalidity. 
The Special Regression Design. This is a quasi-exper-
imental design; it is in essence a simulation of a true 
experiment; namely, the posttest-only control group design. 
The special regression design deals with those situations 
in which all members of an identified target population 
must participate in the treatment. This type of design 
selects the treatment participants on the basis of a cut-
ting score on a quantified composite of qualifications. 
Specifically, any student whose score falls below the cut-
off score will be assigned to the treatment; those who 
score above the cutoff score are assigned to the control 
group. At the appropriate time both groups are posttested. 
The effectiveness of the treatment is determined by a 
statistical procedure called regression. It examines the 
regression line for predicting posttest performance. This 
predicted posttest performance is compared to the actual 
posttest performance. If a significant difference is found 
between them, the treatment is judged to be effective. For 
example, if an average posttest score of 10 was predicted 
for the group and the actual posttest average is 20, it is 
concluded that the treatment caused the 10 point differ-
ence. 
The Control Group Design. This design typifies the 
true experiment. The control group design must satisfy 
three conditions. First, a single, well-defined population 
of students who has not been exposed to the treatment must 
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be identified. Second, two samples must be selected at 
random from this population. And third, the treatment must 
be randomly assigned to the different samples. That is, 
one sample must receive the treatment, and the other sample 
must provide the control (no-treatment) . Both samples are 
pretested and posttested. According to Gay (1980), the 
combination of randomization, the pretesting, and the pres-
ence of the control group provides a control for all 
sources of invalidity. 
In order to determine the effectiveness of the treat-
ment, the posttest scores of both samples are analyzed 
either using directly a t-test or using analysis of covari-
ance. Analysis of covariance adjusts posttest scores for 
initial differences on any variable, including pretest 
scores. 
The use of this type of design in evaluation studies 
has provoked a heated controversy in the field. this 
design has been questioned on legal, ethical, philosophi-
cal, and feasibility grounds (Gay, 1980). Questions have 
also been raised over its claimed validity. In addition, 
it is argued that the use of experimental designs in evalu-
ation conflicts with the notion of curriculum improvement. 
In this particular, Guba (1969) states: 
Perhaps the most damaging assertion that may be 
made about the application of conventional exper-
imental design to evaluation situations is that 
such application conflicts with the principle 
that evaluation should facilitate the continuous 
improvement of a program. Experimental designs 
prevents rather than promotes changes in the 
treatments because, as has been noted, treatments 
cannot be altered if the data about differences 
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between treatments are to be equivocal. Thus, 
the treatment must accommodate the evaluation 
design rather than vice versa (p. 35). 
Patton (1975), in agreement with Guba, also comments: 
Because of a commitment to a single evaluation 
paradigm evaluators are frequently prepared to 
actually do everything in their power to stop 
program adaptation and improvement so as not to 
interfere with their research design. The dele-
terious effects this may have on the program 
itself by discouraging new developments and 
redefinitions ... is considered a small sacrifice 
to be made in pursuit of a higher level of scien-
tific knowledge (p. 33). 
Data Analysis Techniques 
Achievement test data are analyzed by statistical pro-
cedures. Two types of statistics are involved, descriptive 
and inferential. 
Descriptive Statistics. This is the first step in 
data analysis. Descriptive statistical analysis is con-
cerned with the organization and description of the data. 
There are four major types of descriptive statistics: (1) 
measures of central tendency, (2) measures of variability, 
(3) measures of relative position, and (4) measures of 
relationship. 
The measures of central tendency are used to determine 
the average score of the group of scores. There are three 
major types of measures of central tendency: the mode, the 
median, and the mean. The mean (X) is the preferred mea-
sure since it is the most stable. The X is the arith-
metic average of the scores; it is computed by summing up 
all the scores (eX) and dividing that total by the number 
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of scores (N). The formula is represented as X= eXjN. 
The X provides a single score or index that describes the 
performance of the entire group. 
The measures of variability indicate how spread or 
disperse is the group of scores. The three measures of 
variability most frequently encountered are the range, the 
quartile deviation, and the standard deviation. The stan-
dard deviation (SO) is the preferred measure of variability 
in evaluation. Like the X, the measure of central ten-
dency which is its counterpart, the SO is considered the 
most stable measure of variability. These two measures 
provide a picture of how the distribution of the scores 
looks like. In a normal distribution, for instance, the 
X plus 3 SOs and the X minus 3 SDs encompass just about 
the 99% of the scores (Figure 6) . This notion is expressed 
as follows: X ± 3 SO = 99% of the scores. 
The measures of relative position indicate where a 
score is in relation to all other scores in the normal dis-
tribution. As suggested earlier, there are four major mea-
sures of relative position: the percentile ranks, the stan-
dard scores, grade equivalents, and normal curve equiva-
lents. It was also noted that the evaluation of federally 
funded curricula uses the relative measures of normal curve 
equivalents (NCEs) • The NCEs are standards which have been 
transformed to fit the normal curve (Anastasi, 1976; Gay, 
1980). It is usually required a gain of 10 NCEs to judge a 
curriculum as effective. 
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The measures of relationship are used to find out to 
what degree the two sets of scores are related. The degree 
of relationship is expressed as a correlation coefficient. 
A correlation coefficient is a decimal number between .00 
and± 1.00. If the coefficient is near +1.00, the two sets 
of scores are positively correlated. If the coefficient 
approximates to -1.00, the two sets of scores are inversely 
related. Coefficients near the .oo indicate weak or no 
relationships. 
Most correlational techniques are based on the assump-
tion that the relationship being investigated is a linear 
one. The correlational technique most commonly used is the 
Pearson r. Like the X and the so, the Pearson r is 
considered the most stable measure of relationship. 
Inferential Statistics. The inferential statistical 
analysis is basically concerned with inferences or general-
izations about the population based on the behavior of the 
treatment and control groups. For example, if a posttest 
difference between the means of the two groups was previ-
ously found the question of interest in inferential statis-
tics is whether a similar difference exists in the popula-
tion from which the two groups were selected. 
Underlying the application of inferential statistics 
is the concept of the "null hypothesis." The null hypothe-
sis is essentially the chance explanation for the differ-
ence found between the two sample means. It hypothesizes 
that there is no true difference in the population from 
which the samples were drawn, and that any difference found 
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in the samples is the result of chance or sampling error 
(Best, 1970; Gay, 1980, 1981). A null hypothesis might 
state: 
There is no significant difference between the 
mean math achievement of junior high school stu-
dents who participate in curriculum A and the 
mean math achievement of junior high school stu-
dents who participate in curriculum B. 
The rejection or acceptance of a null hypothesis is 
based upon some level of significance as a criterion. In 
evaluation, the 5 percent level of significance (.05) is 
often used as the standard for rejection. Rejecting the 
null hypothesis at .05 level indicates that a difference in 
means as large as that found between the sample means would 
not likely have resulted from chance or sampling error in 
more than 5 out of 100 replications of the evaluation 
study. This suggests, 95 percent of the time, that the 
difference was due to the treatment rather than chance. 
For testing the null hypothesis, a parametric test of 
significance is conducted. There are four major parametric 
tests: (1) the t-test, (2) simple analysis of variance 
(ANOVA), (3) analysis of covariance (ANCOVA), and (4) the 
Scheffe test. The selection of the appropriate test is 
determined by factors such as the measurement scale, the 
method of selection of the groups, the number of groups, 
and the number of treatments (Gay, 1980). The parametric 
tests make two assumptions about the nature of the samples: 
1. The means of the samples will be normally 
distributed. 
2. The mean of the sample means will approximate 
the mean of the population (Best, 1970). 
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In regard to the nature of the values of the population, 
the parametric tests assume that: 
1. The population values are normally 
distributed or, if not, the nature of their 
distribution is known. 
2. The population values have equal variances or 
the ratio of their variances is known (Best, 
1970) • 
The results of the application of statistical analysis are 
interpreted in terms of the evaluation hypothesis. 
As Eisner (1985b) notes, the use of statistics in 
evaluation is so pervasive that of the 47 studies published 
in the American Educational Research Journal in 1975 only 
one was non-statistical. It is believed that statistical 
studies are the epitome of good science (Patton, 1978). 
This section has discussed the quantitative approach 
to evaluation. This approach, as noted, relies upon the 
use of standardized achievement tests, research designs, 
and statistical techniques. As Patton (1975) observes, the 
very dominance of this approach appears to have cut off the 
great majority of its practitioners from serious considera-
tions of any alternative methodology. For instance, Camp-
bell and Stanley (1963), in their widely used methodologi-
cal primer, refer to this approach as "the only available 
route to cumulative progress" (p. 3). According to Patton 
(1975), practitioners of this dominant approach seem to be 
unaware that it is a philosophy upon which they stand. 
This underlying philosophy is examined in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE POSITIVIST TRADITION 
Introduction 
The preceding chapter has presented the framework that 
the dominant paradigm provides for the field of curriculum 
evaluation. Underlying this framework is the philosophy of 
positivism. The essential attributes of positivism, 
according to the French positivist Auguste Comte (1798-
1857), are those that correspond to the word "positive." 
By "positive" he means "relative, organic. precise, 
certain, useful, and real" (as translated by Bridges, 1957, 
p. 63). Comte also distinguishes positivism as the "only" 
philosophical world view which is "wholly disconnected with 
Theology" (Bridges, 1957, p. 100). 
Philosophical positivism rests on the postulate of 
"scientism." It holds that, excepting knowledge of logical 
and mathematical system, science provides the model of the 
only kind of knowledge we can attain. This means that all 
that we can know is what we can observe, and it follows 
that everything we claim to know must be capable of empiri-
cal verification. Positivism thus denies the validity of 
nonempirical modes of knowing (e.g., "a priori" knowledge), 
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and equally denies the validity of theological and meta-
physical knowledge. This latter position is explicitly 
stated by the eighteenth-century British philosopher David 
Hume (1711-1776), when he urges the destruction of theology 
and metaphysics: 
When we run over to libraries persuaded of these 
principles, what havoc must we make? ... Take in 
hand any volume of divinity or school meta-
physics .•. and let us ask: Does it contain any 
abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number? 
No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning 
concerning matter of fact and existence? No. 
Commit it then to the flames: For it contains 
nothing but sophistry and illusion (as quoted by 
Lavine, 1984, pp. 181-182). 
According to Schroyer (1973), scientism has been 
defended in at least three different ways through the 
development of positivism. He notes, for instance, that 
Comte defends scientism by arguing that human society pro-
gresses to the extent that it utilizes the results of the 
natural sciences. While the English positivist John stuart 
Mill defends this postulate by calling for the application 
to the scientific method in all spheres of inquiry. The 
exponents of logical positivism defend scientism, Schroyer 
observes, by claiming that the progress of human society is 
closely tied to the advancement of the sciences. 
Critical theorists regard positivism as an 
"unreflective" philosophy. For example, Jurgen Habermas 
asserts that positivism has replaced reflection in episte-
mology for a concern with scientistic methodology. He 
refers to this as the "dissolution" of epistemology. His 
critique Knowledge and Human Interests (1971) is an attempt 
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to "recover" the "experience of reflection" in epistemol-
ogy. He states: 
In following the process of the dissolution of 
epistemology, which has left the philosophy of 
science in its place, one makes one's way over 
abandonment stages of reflection. Retreading 
this path from the perspective that looks back 
toward the point of departure may help to recover 
the forgotten experience of reflection. That we 
disavow reflection is positivism (Habermas, 1971, 
p. vii). 
Building upon Habermas, Michael Apple contends that the 
legitimation of this philosophy that "disavows significant 
critical self-reflection" in educational institutions has 
led educators to perceive their "style of scientific ratio-
nality as being interest free thereby contributing to an 
already strongly manipulative ethos of schooling" (Apple, 
1975b p, 121). 
Positivism is not a recent philosophy nor the concep-
tion of a single thinker. Its antecedents can be found in 
early thought. In ancient times, it is the Sophists and 
Epicureans who have been expressly singled out as represen-
tatives of positivism; in the Middle Ages, it is the Nomi-
nalists. For the modern period, Frondizi (1963) offers 
Otto Neurath's list of precursors corresponding respec-
tively to England, France, and Germany: "Bacon, Hobbes, 
Locke, Hume, Bentham, J.S. Mill, Spencer; Descartes, Bayle, 
D'Alembart, Saint-Simon, Comte, Poincare; Leibniz, Balzano, 
Mach" (p. 49). Charlton (1959), in reviewing positivism, 
discerns four major phases in its development since the 
seventeenth century to the present: 
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1. The British empiricist thinkers from Locke 
onwards and their French counterparts, the 
'philosophies' from Bayle to Condillac and 
Condorcet; 
2. The thinkers of the nineteenth century like 
Saint-Simon, Comte, Mill, Feuerbach, and 
Spencer; 
3. The generation between 1880 and 1920, includ-
ing Mach, Poincare, Duhem, and Russell; and 
4. The present-day exponents of logical 
positivism (p. 4). 
Charlton also observes that positivism has become the domi-
nant philosophical world view of such countries as Austria, 
Germany, France, England, and the United States for the 
past eighty years. 
Using Charlton's sketch, it can be said that posi-
tivism has proclaimed to be the philosophy of the natural 
as well as the social sciences since its second developmen-
tal phase. As far as 1848, for instance, Auguste Compte 
declared: 
Positivism has gradually taken possession of the 
preliminary sciences of Physics and Biology, and 
in these the old system no longer prevails. All 
that remained was to complete the range of its 
influence to the study of social phenomena (as 
translated by Bridges, 1957, p. 12). 
In the social sciences in particular, Schroyer (1973) 
observes that positivism is committed to "provide more 
effective technical recommendations for piecemeal social 
engineering" (p. 118). 
The remainder of this third chapter will be devoted to 
discussing the basic positivist assumptions concerning: 
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the nature of reality, the nature of subject-object rela-
tionship, the nature of truth statements, and the nature of 
value judgments. 
Basic Assumptions 
The Nature of Reality 
Positivism rejects all theological, or metaphysical 
conceptions of the world. It argues that the world of the 
theologian, or of the metaphysician is an ''ideal creation" 
independent from sense-experience that tells nothing about 
what is actually real. It then maintains that the world we 
do experience is the material world, and it is in this 
world that reality is to be found. This reality, according 
to positivism, is existentially "out there." It is one, 
i.e., a single and uniform reality; and it exists according 
to invariable natural laws. Positivism further asserts 
that we don't know the "essence" (or the ultimate nature) 
of this reality but rather its phenomena and their rela-
tionships. This knowledge of phenomena, however, is not 
absolute, but relative and conditional. Underlying this 
assertion is the assumption that the world is a determined 
world where its phenomena are invariably related in terms 
of cause and effect. This means that the world of phenom-
ena is a world in which "if B has constantly been observed 
to follow A in certain conditions, then, given exactly the 
same conditions, we are entitled to suppose that B will 
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again follow A" (Charlton, 1959, p. 7). This ontological 
posture is best explained by J. S. Mill: 
We have no knowledge of anything but Phenom-
ena .... We know not the essence, nor the real 
mode of production, of any fact, but only its 
relations to other facts in the way of succession 
or of similitude. These relations are constant; 
that is, always the same in the same circum-
stances. The constant resemblance which link 
phenomena together, and the constant sequences 
which unite them as antecedent and consequent, 
are termed their laws. The laws of phenomena are 
all we know respecting them. Their essential 
nature, and their ultimate causes ... are unknown 
and inscrutable to us (quoted in Charlton, 1959, 
p. 7). 
Prior to Mill, David Hume had argued that those who claim 
to know the ultimate nature of reality are either knaves or 
fools: fools because they don't understand that we are 
limited to sense perception in what we can know, and knaves 
insofar as knowing this limitation, they persuade us to 
follow a false philosophy (Lavine, 1984). 
The phenomenal world of the positivist includes both 
physical and human phenomena. As Auguste Comte puts it, 
" ... all events whatever, the events of our own personal and 
social life included, are always subject to natural rela-
tions of sequence and similitude ... " (as translated by 
Bridges, 1957, p. 29). The purpose of positivist inquiry, 
then, is to explain phenomena and to formulate their laws. 
This inquiry, however, is confined to the "how." The 
"why," according to positivists, is a question to be left 
to the "imagination" of the theologians or to the 
"subtleties" of the metaphysicians (Charlton, 1959). 
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Guba and Lincoln (1981) specifically observe that pos-
itivist inquirers tend to see phenomena as "fragmentable 
into series of independent subsystems" (p. 56). These sub-
systems are often called "variables" and their relation-
ships are expressed in the function y = f(x) where x is 
defined as the variable to be manipulated and y is the 
variable on which the effect of the manipulation of x is to 
be determined. They note that the relationships of vari-
ables are principally explained for the purpose of predict-
ing and controlling phenomena. Similar observations have 
been made by Guba and Lincoln (1983) and Guba (1983). 
Building upon these observations, Koetting (1984) distin-
guishes the positivist ontology as follows: 
For the positivist researcher, reality is a 
'given.' It exists 'out there,' and can be 
divided into dependent and independent variables. 
These can be studied independently of each other. 
'Inquiry can converge onto that reality until, 
finally, it can be predicted and controlled.' In 
other words, the world is seen as given, single, 
tangible, fragmentable, convergent (p. 9). 
The Nature of Subject-Object Relationship 
Positivism erects a separation, a dichotomy, between 
the individual human being (the subject) engaging in the 
activity of knowing reality (the object). Koetting (1984), 
basing on Egon Guba's discussion, puts it this way: 
The researcher maintains a distance between self 
and the object under investigation, 'neither dis-
turbing it, or being disturbed by it' (p. 9). 
This separation rests on the assumption that reality exists 
independently of the human mind. This means that reality 
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"is" whether or not the human mind is consciously aware of 
it or takes any interest in it (cf. Smith, 1983). Morris' 
(1961) description of what he calls a "common sense view of 
the ontology-epistemology relationship," though in a dif-
ferent context, is pertinent here: 
Reality is not an Absolute Mind thinking thoughts 
or an Infinite Self on which we are microcosms. 
Reality just is, without regard to human plans or 
purposes. It is, one might say, epistemologi-
cally neutral; to render it anthropomorphically 
we might say that reality is 'out there waiting 
to be known'; ontologically it is simply 'there' 
and awaits the onset of epistemological activity 
toward it. If anything can be called a common 
sense view of the ontology-epistemology relation-
ship, certainly this can (p. 141). 
Schroyer (1973) notes that positivism not only sepa-
rates the knowing subject from the object of knowledge, but 
denies the "reflective participation" of the subject in the 
process of knowing. The subject confines himself to "copy" 
the elements of the independently existing object; knowing 
is merely a passive "picturing" of reality. He refers to 
this conception of knowing as "objectivism." Such a view 
of knowing, Schroyer points out, is rejected by critical 
philosophy. Critical philosophy places the human subject 
in an active role in the construction of knowledge and 
reality. In fact, it asserts that it is the human mind, 
human consciousness, who creates the object that is known 
through the act of self-reflection. 
The positivist theory of knowledge, as the literature 
reveals, is fundamentally based on the sensationalism of 
John Locke and the skepticism of David Hume. John Locke, 
for instance, reduces knowledge to two basic questions. 
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The first question is: How do you know? If you can not 
answer Locke's question by showing that your knowledge 
rests upon sensory experience, observation of data, or 
experimentation with data, then you have no knowledge. He 
claims that sensory experience is the source and test of 
knowledge. The second question that Locke raises is: What 
kind of instrument is the human mind? He argues that 
"there is nothing in the mind except what was first in the 
senses" (as quoted in Durant, 1961, P. 256). The mind is 
at birth a "tabula rasa" or a "clean sheet" on which sense-
experience writes upon it in a thousand ways (Durant, 
1961) ; this writing by experience is all the mind can know 
(Lavine, 1984). Thus, the origin of our knowledge is in 
sensory experience through the mind receiving sensations 
from external objects. 
David Hume, according to Lavine (1984), divides sen-
sory experience into impressions and ideas. Impressions 
are our immediate sensations. Ideas are copies or images 
of impressions. Every idea has a corresponding impression 
from which it arises. As David Hume states: 
When I shut my eyes and think of my chamber the 
ideas I form are exact representations of the 
impressions I felt; nor is there any circum-
stances of the one which is not in the 
other ... ideas and impressions appear always to 
correspond to each other (as quoted by Lavine, 
1984, p. 153). 
Hume argues that any idea which comes from no impression is 
worthless as knowledge and meaningless as an idea. Lavine 
refers to this argument as Hume's empiricist rule. He 
explains it in this way: "Where there is no impression, 
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there is no adequate idea. Where there is no impression, 
the idea is meaningless" (p. 155). He also notes that Hume 
basing on this rule proclaims that philosophical knowledge 
is not merely false but is meaningless since it derives 
from no immediate impression. Lavine considers David Hume 
as the "most destructive force in the history of Western 
philosophy" (p. 130) . 
The Nature of Truth Statements 
Positivism rejects the "coherence" definition of truth 
advanced by idealist philosophers since this definition 
assumes that truth is mind-dependent. Positivism maintains 
that truth depends upon something which lies outside the 
mind. In view of this, positivism adheres firmly to the 
theory that our knowledge of truths is essentially a matter 
of correspondence. 
Truth as Correspondence. In his work The Problems of 
Philosophy, Russell (1959), for instance, theorizes that 
truth consists in "some form of correspondence between 
belief and fact" (p. 121). A belief, according to him, is 
a "relation of believing or judging which relates a mind to 
several things other than itself" (p. 126). These several 
things are extrinsic to the mind: they belong to the inde-
pendently existing world. They constitute what he calls a 
"fact." He then defines a "fact" as a "complex unity com-
posed only of the objects of the belief" (p. 128). The 
correspondence between belief and this "complex unity" 
ensures truth. The absence of this correspondence entails 
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falsehood. Russell restates his correspondence theory of 
truth as follows: 
••. If we take such a belief as •otello believes 
that Desdemona loves Cassia', we will call Desde-
mona and Cassia the object-terms, and loving the 
object-relation. If there is a complex unity, 
Desdemona's love for Cassia', consisting of the 
object-terms related by the object-relation in 
the same order as they have in the belief, then 
this complex unity is called the fact correspond-
ing to the belief. Thus a belief is true when 
there is a corresponding fact, and is false when 
there is no corresponding fact (p. 129). 
He further asserts that the mind does not create truth. 
The mind creates beliefs, but once the beliefs are created, 
the mind cannot make them true. What makes a belief true 
is a fact, and this fact, according to him, does not in any 
way involve the mind of the person who has the belief. As 
he expresses: 
•.• the condition of the truth of a belief is 
something not involving ... any mind at all, but 
only the objects of the belief. A mind, which 
believes, believes truly when there is a corre-
sponding complex not involving the mind, but only 
its objects (p.l29). 
Based upon his correspondence definition of truth, 
Russell draws a distinction between knowledge, error, and 
probable opinion. If what we firmly believe is true, we 
can call it knowledge, he maintains. But, in contrast, if 
what we firmly believe is not true, this is an error. How-
ever, if what we firmly believe is neither knowledge or 
error, then it is probable opinion. Russell argues that 
much of what commonly passes as knowledge is more or less 
probable opinion. He also contends that although a body of 
individually probable opinions may become more probable 
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than any one of them would be individually, probable opin-
ions will never constitute "indubitable knowledge" (p. 
140) . 
A pupil of Russell, the Austrian positivist Ludwig 
Wittgenstein (1899-1951) maintains that a statement about 
the world is true if it "pictures" actual facts for us (cf. 
Hartnack, 1965; Lavine, 1984). Wittgenstein refers to 
actual facts as present "states of affairs." And in any 
picture, he says, there must be a correspondence between 
the picture and the state of affairs it represents. State-
ments which fail to provide this picture are without any 
meaning at all, they are nonsensical. For Wittgenstein, 
only the statements of the natural sciences provide a pic-
ture of states of affairs. He argues that any kind of phi-
losophizing must be directed to clarify the meaning of 
scientific statements. Philosophy, according to him, is 
not a doctrine but an activity. And he adds: 
The correct method in philosophy would really be 
the following: to say nothing except what can be 
said, i.e., propositions of natural science--
i.e., something that has nothing to do with 
philosophy ... (quoted in Lavine, 1984, p. 404) 
According to White (1970), all versions of the Carre-
spondence Theory of Truth rest on the principle of logical 
equivalence, which holds that "p is true if and only if p" 
(p. 98). This principle, as he indicates, was originally 
expressed in Aristotle's famous dictum "to say of what is 
that it is or of what is not that it is not, is true" (p. 
102). He notes that since this principle suggest that 
there must be some additional item other than "what is 
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said" which makes "what is said true," most correspondence 
theorists insist that this item is a "fact" (p. 102). And 
"because the relation between what is said and this item is 
called a correspondence," their definitions of truth usu-
ally take the form of "To say that something is true is to 
say that there is a correspondence between it and a fact" 
(p. 102). White observes that correspondence theorists 
have found it difficult to explicate what they mean by 
"fact," "correspondence," and even "what is said." 
Similar observations have been made by Deutsch (1979). 
But, he also notes that correspondence theorists are making 
efforts to elaborate an adequate explication of these terms 
since they feel that "there is something so undeniably 
right about the correspondence conception of truth" that 
it can not be abandoned (p. 81). Deutsch disagrees with 
this position and argues instead that what is needed is an 
alternative definition of truth. He proposes to conceptu-
alize truth as the "achievement of rightness." He states 
his definition as follows: 
X is true when and only when it achieves right-
ness through the articulation of its own inten-
tionality. X is perceived by Y to be true when Y 
recognizes that there is no correct alternative 
to X within the matrix of its presentation (p. 
91) • 
By "X" Deutsch means anything that has the capacity to 
realize rightness, and "Y" refers to the person qualified 
to perceive that X is true. His definition rests on the 
assumptions that the world we experience is constituted by 
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particularity, and that truth is an inherent quality of 
particular things. 
Kinds of Truths. For positivists, only two kinds of 
true statements exist: analytic and synthetic. Analytic 
statements are those tautological propositions found in the 
fields of logic and mathematics, while synthetic statements 
represent the empirical propositions of science. All other 
types of statements (e.g., the statements of metaphysics) 
are neither true nor false, but cognitively meaningless 
(Lavine, 1984; White, 1955). Hence, the concept of 
"meaning" (as defined by positivists) becomes the criterion 
for determining the truth of a statement. As Morris (1961) 
notes, positivist epistemologists utilize the method of 
"linguistic analysis" for establishing the meaning of 
propositional statements. This method, according to 
Morris, analyzes the linguistic relationship that a predi-
cate of a proposition bears to its subject. He describes 
positivist epistemology as basically "an exercise in logic 
or an exercise in the analysis of the language we use to 
utter our ideas" (p. 173). 
According to the positivist method, an analytic propo-
sition is true because it is a "tautology," that is, its 
predicate is already contained in the meaning of the sub-
ject (Morris, 1961, p. 175). For example, the proposition 
"All husbands are married" is an analytic truth (cf. 
Popkin and Stroll, 1956, p. 182). The predicate "married" 
can be found in the meaning of the subject "husband" since 
the definition of a "husband" is that husbands are "married 
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males." This proposition is true by definition. It is 
also a logical truth. One cannot, without contradiction, 
deny the truth of this proposition. In other words, it is 
logically impossible to conceive of any circumstances in 
which somebody could be a husband and yet not be married. 
The positivist Russell (1959) maintains that analytic 
propositions are general statements which assert logical 
relations of "universals." By "universals" he means 
abstractions. According to him, universals are "neither in 
space nor in time, neither material not mental" (p. 98). 
He also argues that universals do not "exist" but "subsist 
or have being, where being is opposed to existence as being 
timeless" (p. 100). For example, the mathematical proposi-
tion "Two and two are four" states a relation between the 
universal "two" and the universal "four." Russell further 
contends that the truths of analytic propositions are 
"self-evident," that is, they are incapable of proof. 
According to him, we can deductively infer other self-evi-
dent truths from analytic truths. He identifies three 
principles of formal logic assumed in such a deduction. 
They are the following: 
1. The principle of identity: 
is. ' 
'Whatever is, 
2. The principle of contradiction: 
both be and not be.' 
'Nothing can 
3. The principle of excluded middle: 
'Everything must either be or not be.' 
These three logical principles, according to Russell, are 
also self-evident truths. 
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One of the maximum exponents of twentieth-century pos-
itivism, Rudolf Carnap regards analytic propositions as 
"trivial" (cf. Popkin and Stroll, 1956). Carnap argues 
that from the truth of an analytic proposition we cannot 
infer that the items mentioned exist. For example, from 
the analytic truth that "All giants are giants" we cannot 
infer that there are any giants in the world. Thus, ana-
lytic propositions tell us nothing about the world of expe-
rience. They happen to be true merely by virtue of their 
logical form. Wittgenstein, as noted by Hartnack (1965), 
insists, however, that analytic propositions in a way do 
tell something about the empirical world. They tell us 
that the language we use to formulate the propositions and 
the world they claim to describe have the same logical 
structure. With regard to the language specifically, 
Popkin and Stroll (1956) note that Wittgenstein assumes 
that the language of a proposition resembles the structure 
of symbolic language of Principia Mathematica developed by 
Russell and Whitehead. 
Since analytic truths make no assertions about the 
world of experience, they cannot be refuted by experience, 
maintain the positivists. For example, experience cannot 
refute the analytic truth that asserts that "two plus two 
equals four." This is a formal, abstract truth indepen-
dently of any experience we might have (cf. Lavine, 1984). 
Thus , analytic propositions cannot establish any truth 
about existence. Yet they are useful, claim the posi-
tivists. They provide some guidance in "our empirical 
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search for knowledge" (Ayer, 1969, p. 42); they also supply 
us with those "transformation rules" that we need for 
applying to the "only genuine" propositions about the 
world, the synthetic propositions of science (cf. Pap, 
1969, p. 60). 
A synthetic proposition, as defined by positivists, is 
one whose predicate is not contained in the meaning of the 
subject: rather, its predicate has been attached to the 
subject on the basis of experience (Morris, 1961). For 
example, the proposition "All bachelors are introverts" is 
a synthetic one; its predicate "introvert'' is not contained 
in the meaning of the subject "bachelor." According to 
positivists, the meaning of a synthetic proposition is to 
be found not in the words that make up the proposition, but 
in its method of empirical verification. As F. Waissman 
puts it: 
If there is no possible way to determine whether 
a statement is true then that statement has no 
meaning whatsoever. For the meaning of a state-
ment is the method of its verification (quoted in 
Popper, 1961, p. 40). 
That is, if you cannot describe what sorts of observations 
would lead you to verify the truth of your assertion, then, 
your assertion is meaningless; or, as Rudolf Carnap says, 
"your assertion is no assertion at all; it does not speak 
about anything; it is nothing but a series of empty words; 
it is simply without sense" (in White, 1955, p. 211). 
Thus, a synthetic proposition is meaningful if and only if 
it is empirically verifiable. This condition is often 
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referred to as the positivist "verifiability criterion of 
meaning." 
In reviewing the criterion, Erwin (1970) notes that 
positivists make the claim that in advocating its use they 
are following the suggestion of the physicist Albert 
Einstein. He quotes, for instance, the leading positivist 
Moritz Schlick as saying: "All I am trying to do is to 
stick consistently to Einstein's position and to admit no 
exceptions from it" (p. 19). Erwin also observes that pos-
itivists often acknowledge Wittgenstein as providing the 
original version of this criterion, when he said in his 
work The Tractatus Logico-Philosoohicus (1922): "In the 
verification of a proposition lies its sense •••• If we do 
away with all means of verification we destroy the meaning" 
(p. 21). According to Quine (1969), this positivist crite-
rion rests upon the "dogma of reductionism" initiated by 
Locke and Hume. He describes this dogma as the "belief 
that each meaningful statement is equivalent to some logi-
cal construct upon terms which refer to immediate experi-
ence" (p. 116). He notes that several positivists, for 
instance Carnap, embarked on the project to reduce scien-
tific generalization into singular statements of immediate 
experience; but scientific statements "fell short of reduc-
tion not merely through sketchiness, but in principle" (p. 
134). Quine indicates that Carnap, in his later writings, 
seems to have abandoned reductionism in its radical form. 
It is contended that the criterion of verifiability is 
a "strategem" devised by positivists with the intention to 
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destroy metaphysical theories, e.g., Hegel's metaphysics. 
This criterion rejects metaphysical propositions as mean-
ingless. The positivist A.J. Ayer, for instance, states: 
If a putative proposition fails to satisfy 
this principle [i.e., the criterion of verifia-
bility], and is not a tautology, then I hold that 
it is metaphysical, and that being metaphysical, 
it is neither true nor false but literally sense-
less (quoted in Morris, 1961, p. 176). 
The philosopher of science Karl R. Popper dissents in this 
particular from his positivist "friends" (as he calls them) 
by expressing: 
If by the words 'nonsensical' or 
'meaningless' we wish to express ... 'not belonging 
to empirical science', then the characterization 
of metaphysics as meaningless nonsense would be 
trivial; for metaphysics has usually been defined 
as nonempirical. But of course, the positivists 
believe they can say much more about metaphysics 
than that some of its statements are non-empiri-
cal. 
And he continues, 
The words 'meaningless' or 'nonsensical' convey, 
and are meant to convey, a derogatory evaluation; 
and there is no doubt that what the positivists 
really want to achieve is not so much a success-
ful demarcation as the final overthrow and the 
annihilation of metaphysics (Popper, 1961, pp. 
35-36). 
Popper further contends that positivists "in their anxiety 
to annihilate metaphysics, annihilate natural science along 
with it" (p. 36). According to him, scientific theories, 
e.g., laws and prediction, are not conclusively verifi-
ables. About this, Russell (1959), however, insists that 
the validity of scientific laws and predictions can be ver-
ified with the inductive principle of probability logic. 
He states this principle as follow: 
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(a) When a thing of certain sort A has been 
found to be associated with a thing of 
certain other sort B, and has never been 
found dissociated from a thing of the sort 
B, the greater the number of cases in which 
A and B have been associated, the greater 
the probability is that they will be 
associated in a fresh case in which one of 
them is known to be present; 
(b) Under the same circumstances, a sufficient 
number of cases of association will make the 
probability of a fresh association nearly a 
certainty, and will make it approach 
certainty without limit (p. 66). 
According to Russell, this principle is assumed in the for-
mulation of all scientific theories, and its truth, like 
all logical truths, is self-evident. 
The Nature of Value Judgments 
Positivists categorize value judgments a "pseudo-
assertions." They maintain that although value judgments 
have as similar grammatical form to the assertive proposi-
tions of science (i.e., to synthetic propositions), they 
are not assertions at all. Value judgments, they argue, 
are merely disguised ways of formulating prescriptions or 
commands. For instance, to say the "Stealing money is 
wrong" is to assert nothing, but to prescribe that "You 
ought not to steal money" or to command, e.g., "Do not 
steal money" (cf. White, 1970, pp. 57-65). According to 
positivists, since value judgments have no assertional 
sense, they lie completely outside disputes of truth and 
falsehood. In this regard, Rudolf Carnap writes: 
Most philosophers have been deceived by this form 
into thinking that a value statement is really an 
assertive proposition and must be either true or 
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false. Therefore they give reasons for their own 
value statements and try to disprove those of 
their opponents. But actually a value statement 
is nothing else than a command in a misleading 
grammatical form. It may have effects upon the 
actions of men, and these effects may either be 
in accordance with our wishes or not; but it is 
neither true nor false. It does not assert any-
thing and can neither be proved nor disproved (in 
White, 1955, p. 217). 
Carnap further claims that since value judgments are nei-
ther true nor false, they are theoretically senseless. As 
he puts it, "The propositions of normative ethics, whether 
they have the form of rules or the form of value state-
ments, have no theoretical sense, are not scientific propo-
sitions •.. " (in White, 1955, p. 218). 
Positivists, as the literature reveals, also advance 
an "emotivist" thesis of values. This thesis postulates 
that value statements, unlike assertive propositions, have 
no representative or symbolic linguistic function. Rather, 
value statements are, like laughing, crying, and singing, 
expressive. They express our personal feelings, attitudes, 
desires, and emotions. This thesis is explained in C.K. 
Ogden and I.A. Richards' interpretation of the ethical con-
cept "good." They jointly write: 
This concept, it is said, is the subject 
matter of real ethics. This peculiar ethical use 
of the word 'good' is, we suggest, a purely emo-
tive one. When so used, the word stands for 
nothing whatsoever, and has no symbolic function. 
Thus, when we use it in the sentence 'This is 
good' we merely refer to 'this,' and the addition 
of 'is good' makes no difference to our ref-
erence. When, on the other hand, we say "this is 
red,' the addition of 'is red' to 'this' does 
symbolize an extension of our reference, namely 
to some other red thing. But 'is good' has no 
comparable symbolic function; it serves only as 
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an emotive sign expressing our attitude to 'this' 
(quoted by Frondizi, 1963, p. 52). 
And according to positivists, expressions of emotions, too, 
are neither true nor false because they do not assert any-
thing about the world; they are cognitively or theoreti-
cally senseless. Therefore, they conclude, we assign them 
to the realm of metaphysics. And Rudolf Carnap, for 
instance, adds that David Hume was right when he said that 
"only the propositions of mathematics and empirical science 
have sense, and that all other propositions are without 
sense" (in White, 1955, p. 224). 
As suggested by Bernstein (1978) and Frondizi (1963), 
this "emotivist" thesis goes beyond its original subjec-
tivist version of the nature of values as to negate the 
very possibility of the existence of values. Now, within 
this new axiological "doctrine," writes, for instance, 
Frondizi, 
..• we do not say anything when we use words which 
have been and are basic in our daily, philosophic 
vocabulary, we don't say anything about the 
object, act or person to whom we attribute the 
quality of being 'good,' but instead we express 
only our own emotional state. 
And furthermore, 
We do not confer value upon an object by means of 
our pleasure, desire or interest as the subjec-
tivists whom we have examined maintain. We are, 
instead, committing the error of thinking that we 
are talking about an object when we are really 
expressing a psychic condition (1963, p. 52). 
Frondizi also notes that positivists claim that the main 
reason for adopting this emotivist position is the 
"complete impossibility of finding any arguments to prove 
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that this or that has intrinsic values" (p. 106). He 
argues that this position is in error. Positivists, main-
tains Frondizi, can not find such arguments because they 
exclude elements which do not coincide with their theories 
and admit only those which are favorable. 
In this regard, positivists respond that in philosoph-
ical positivism there is no place for unscientific expres-
sions (cf. Kraft, 1953, p. 15). Positivism is based on 
rigorous scientific reasoning. Positivists postulate three 
basic requirements of scientific reasoning: (1) unambigu-
ous clarity, (2) logical rigor, and (3) congent argumenta-
tion. They maintain that judgmental expressions do not 
meet these three requirements. According to Kraft (1953), 
judgments are like metaphysical speculations: "subjective, 
matters of opinion, unverifiable. Lacking universal valid-
ity, they are matters of personal conviction, but do not 
represent knowledge 11 (p. 193). 
This section has discussed the philosophical posture 
adopted by positivists toward the nature of ontological 
reality, knowledge, truth, and values. This positivist 
philosophy dominates the curriculum evaluation field. Dur-
ing the late 1960s a new paradigm emerged in the field 
challenging this dominant philosophy. This emergent 
paradigm has been identified as the aesthetic paradigm. 
This paradigm is the concern of the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE AESTHETIC PARADIGM: AN ALTERNATIVE 
Introduction 
Chapters II and III have explained the dominant natural 
. 
science paradigm. Chapter II presented the conceptual and 
methodological framework that this paradigm provides for the 
field of curriculum evaluation. Under this framework the 
curriculum is conceived either as a product or a treatment, 
and quantitative methods are employed in evaluating its 
effects on students' achievements. Chapter III discussed 
some of the positivist assumptions on which this framework 
rests. 
As indicated in the introduction of this study, this 
dominant paradigm has been challenged by three emergent 
paradigms. 1hese new paradigms were identified as the 
legal, the anthropological, and the aesthetic, and a brief 
overview of each was provided. It was also indicated that 
this study has as its second purpose the examination of the 
aesthetic paradigm specifically, hoping that this 
examination will provide the stimulus for researching the 
other alternatives. The purpose of this chapter is to 
provide such an examination. 
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The first part of this examination focuses on the 
assumptions that the aesthetic paradigm offers as an alter-
native to the dominant positivistic assumptions. The 
second part explores some aesthetic views of curriculum, 
and the final part discusses Elliot Eisner's approach to 
evaluation. Eisner, as already mentioned, has become the 
leading advocate of the aesthetic alternative in the field 
of curriculum evaluation. 
Philosophical Assumptions 
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The aesthetic alternative is an interpretive paradigm 
which is basically oriented toward obtaining an understand-
ing of the created world. It is based on the philosophy of 
art. Art, as noted by Deutsch (1979) originates in reli-
gious life. When art stood so close to religion, it was 
regarded as magical and ritual. Song was prayer, drama was 
divine performance, dance was cult. During the period of 
the Renaissance art emerged as a distinct, autonomous 
field. According to Deutsch, when art achieves its 
autonomy from religion, the concept of "quality" becomes 
its fundamental category, and the notion of "meaning" its 
presentational content. 
The aesthetic paradigm takes as its starting point for 
understanding the world the act of human experience. Expe-
rience, as defined by Eisner (1985a), is the consequences 
of the human beings• interaction with the qualities of the 
world. The world is conceived here as an organic whole 
constituted of particular qualities of considerable 
richness and complexity. Experiencing the world is not a 
passive recognition of qualities, but an active-reactive 
exploration of the qualities and their interrelationships. 
It is an act of creation and re-creation. This creative 
process involves a total participation of all human 
capacities; e.g., sensory perception, cognition, intuition, 
imagination, will, emotion, and feeling (cf. Reid, 1964). 
It is argued that there is also a somatic participation in 
the experiential act. As indicated by Berleant (1970), the 
empathic theorists Vernon Lee and Theodor Lipps have 
observed how muscular movements are an integral part of the 
experience in such a way that there is an emulative 
physical participation in the response. For instance, they 
have noted how the human body tends to experience a 
physical imbalance when encountering the quality of 
imbalance. They also maintain that in experiencing the 
qualities of mass and space one becomes part of it. 
Experience is also regarded as highly selective. 
Selectivity is seen as an indispensable condition to get 
hold of the flux of experience. It is argued that the 
function of selection is performed by the values and 
beliefs that the individual brings to the world. These 
values and beliefs also guide the creative process. John 
Dewey, in Art and Experience,stated: 
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Every individual brings with him a way of seeing 
and feeling that in its interaction with old 
material creates something new, something 
previously not existing in experience (quoted in 
Pepper, 1945, p. 60). 
According to the aesthetic paradigm, the positivist notion 
of objectivity is a myth that has been fostered by the 
Lockean idea of the empty mind. Eisner (1985a), 
particularly, believes that the very question of 
objectivity itself reflects naivet~. Objectivity, 
according to him, is an "epistemological impossibility" 
because an "empty mind sees nothing" (p. 185) . 
Human experience is described as unique, personal, 
individual, and private. As an attempt to express and com-
municate the experience, humans create a variety of forms. 
As Eisner (1985a) observes, the dominant natural science 
paradigm employs conventional forms such as numbers and 
propositions to represent the experience. According to 
him, conventional forms are a "surrogate" of an experience; 
i.e., they stand in the place of a referent (the 
experience). In conventions, the relationship between the 
form and the referent is arbitrary. In order to know the 
meaning of the form one must be able to imagine the 
referent. Unlike the dominant paradigm, the aesthetic 
paradigm communicates through artistically expressive 
forms; e.g., literature, music, poetry, painting, 
sculpture, and film. Eisner claims that art forms contain 
in themselves the expressive content to which they are 
related. They embody the experience the individual seeks 
to express. He also argues that the use of expressive 
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forms is crucial when we need to describe emotionally 
loaded situations. To use a form that leaves out the 
emotional content is to render a limited view of the 
situation which can lead to bias and distortions. In this 
particular, he expresses: 
After all, what can be more biased than emotion-
ally eviscerted fact describing conditions or 
situations that are emotionally significant to 
those in the situations being described. 
Distortion can result not only from what is put 
in, but also from what is left out (p. 196). 
One of the central interests of the aesthetic paradigm 
is to contribute to enhancing and expanding the quality of 
human experience. To pursue this interest, the paradigm 
attempts to interpret the meaning of the experience 
embodied in the artistic form. It is believed that the 
artform is essentially a sign or symbol for an experience 
that the creator "means" by it (cf. Berleant, 1970). The 
aesthetician Isenberg (1955) insists that the adoption of 
the aesthetic point of view involves a concern for meaning 
only, and not for observable facts. "I should think," he 
remarks to an audience, 
••• that all of you in this room had read the 
lines from Hyperion many times before and that 
few of you had ever asked yourselves whether you 
agreed with them--and this not from any slackness 
of attention but from the very fullness and 
fineness preoccupation with the meaning ..• To be 
preoccupied with the aesthetic object implies no 
disregard with the 'content' of the poem--only a 
disregard of one function of that content, 
namely, its relationship to observable fact (p. 
398). 
Isenberg argues that it is possible to interpret meaning 
without being concerned with observable referents since 
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what art seeks is understanding and not verification of 
facts. 
According to Eisner (1985a), one way of understanding 
the meaning of an experience is through "empathy," that is, 
to "imaginatively participate in the experience of another" 
(p. 192). He contrasts this mode of understanding with the 
inferential approach in experimentation, which makes infer-
ences from observable behavior to what is nonobservable. 
In the inferential approach there is no need for empathy 
since "observables are used in a kind of statistical 
fashion" in order to estimate the "probability that this 
behavior means one particular thing or another" (p. 192). 
Eisner agrees with the anthropologist Clifford Geertz that 
man is "suspended in webs of significance he himself has 
spun," and that the analysis of those webs requires not an 
"experimental science" but rather an "interpretive one in 
the search for meaning" (p. 192). 
For interpreting the meaning of artistic forms that 
employ the medium of language, the aesthetic paradigm 
relies heavily on the hermeneutical approach. Hermeneutics 
is a dialectical method of interpretation in which there is 
a constant back and forth movement between parts and wholes 
with no absolute starting and ending points {Smith, 1983). 
It is based on the assumption that no part can be fully 
understood apart from the whole, and, conversely, that the 
whole cannot be experienced without understanding the 
parts. This method of interpretation also assumes that the 
interpretation and understanding of human experience cannot 
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be pursued in the absence of the context of activity. As 
Smith (1983) points out, although hermeneutics employs a 
diversified methodology, the unity of the approach is 
maintained by concentrating in the wholistic character of 
the human situation. 
In the visual arts, the search for meaning has become 
so developed that it has evolved into the separate disci-
pline of "iconography" (cf. Berleant, 1970). As noted by 
Hesenmueller (1979), the iconographer Erwin Panofsky has 
proposed the extension of his "iconological" method of 
interpreting meaning in painting to the literary arts. 
Panofsky's method identifies three types of interpretations 
for three levels of meaning in painting. The first inter-
pretation is called "pre-iconographic." It is concerned 
with the recognition and understanding of the "primary or 
natural" level of meaning. This first level of meaning 
contains the visual and expressive content. The second 
type of interpretation is referred to as "iconographic." 
Its task is to decode "secondary or conventional" meanings 
articulated in images or icons. Primary and secondary 
meanings are conscious and decodable. The third type of 
interpretation is called "iconological." Iconology 
interprets what is unconscious and accessible only to 
subjective understanding, that is, the "intrinsic" level of 
meaning. Panofsky's method of interpretation conceives art 
as fundamentally communicative. It is based on the 
Hegelian assumption of the deep interconnectedness of all 
historical phenomena. 
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The task of interpretation is never complete. It is 
believed that the artform, like reality, has multiple 
levels of meaning, and any interpretation will reveal only 
a partial understanding. The aesthetic paradigm allows for 
divergent interpretations. As Eisner (1985a) suggests, the 
criterion of truth is irrelevant here. According to him, 
Truth implies singularity and monopoly. Meaning 
implies relativism and diversity. Truth is more 
closely wedded to consistency and logic, meaning 
to diverse interpretation and coherence (p. 198). 
The interpretation of the meaning of the experience is 
followed by a judgment of its value. According to Irwin 
Edman, the quality of human experience is valued for its 
intensity and depth. 
Whatever experience may portend or signify, 
veil or reveal, it is irretrievably there. It 
may be intensified and heightened or dulled and 
obscured. It may remain brutal and dim and 
chaotic; it may become meaningful and clear and 
alive. For a moment in one aspect, for a 
lifetime in many, experience may achieve lucidity 
and vividness, intensity and depth. To effect 
such an intensification and clarification of 
experience is the province of art (quoted in 
Pepper, 1945, p. 57). 
The more vivid the experience and the more extensive and 
rich its quality, the greater its value. 
Some Aesthetic Views of Curriculum 
As mentioned earlier, the aesthetic paradigm was first 
proposed in the more general field of curriculum. It 
emerged out of a reconceptualist orientation toward that 
field, an orientation concerned with finding new ways of 
thinking and talking about curriculum. According to Mazza 
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(1982), reconceptualists advocating the aesthetic perspec-
tive in curriculum e.xpose some of the limitations of using 
(1) behavioral definitions of objectives and learning as 
central categories in curriculum theory, and (2) technical 
and instrumental rationalities for valuing curriculum expe-
rience. They propose a replacement of these limited views 
for the major concern of how curriculum can enable students 
to develop personal meaning. 
Huebner's (1966) work is often acknowledged as the 
first explicit statement about the importance of viewing 
the curriculum aesthetically. Huebner argues that dominant 
conceptions of curriculum are inadequate in that they tend 
to tie the education process solely to the world of man's 
technique while ignoring his spiritual and transcendental 
nature. This inadequacy stems, according to Huebner, from 
an overdependency on a conception of educational values as 
"goals to be reached or behaviors to be learned" (p. 101). 
He contends that to value the curriculum because it 
"produces something or ends somewhere" is to turn it into a 
"commodity for a future state" (p. 107). Such a view 
denies the intrinsic value of curriculum experience. He 
councels curricularists to see the curriculum with 
"psychical distance." By this he means to see the 
curriculum as an aesthetic form apart from its instrumental 
function of achievement of goals. This mode of seeing 
would also allow curricularists to concentrate on the 
intrinsic aspects of the curriculum cleared from technical 
concerns. 
105 
Building upon Huebner's work, Mann (1969) proposes to 
talk about curriculum as if it were a "literary object." 
According to Mann, a curriculum is similar to a literary 
work in that both have a story, and a network of selections 
representing a universe of possibilities that constitutes 
an assertion of meaning or a symbolic commentary upon life. 
This meaning can be disclosed, he maintains, by critiquing 
the design or patterns of relatedness of the selections. 
But he points out that since the curriculum has many 
designs to be explained and thus many meanings to be dis-
closed, no single critique is exhaustive. He also main-
tains that in critiquing curricula, critics must be selec-
tive. In order for critics to choose among the many 
designs of the curriculum, he suggests they use as a 
criterion their own personal knowledge of ethical reality; 
that is, what they know about right and wrong or good and 
bad. 
Mann argues that to talk about curriculum as a 
literary object also would reveal a peculiar characteristic 
of curriculum: its "unconditionedness." This quality, 
according to Mann, shows how inappropriate technological 
talk is in curriculum. He writes: 
If you turn this proposition around and look 
at it from the other side, it discloses something 
important--the unconditionedness of the curricu-
lum ••• And this explains why technological talk 
cannot comprehend a curriculum •.. For technologi-
cal talk is precisely talk about conditions, 
conditioning, and the conditioned. It is talk 
locked in a means-end cause-effect structure 
which cannot be bent to describe curriculum as 
unconditioned immediacy (p. 29). 
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He proposes as an alternative to technological talk his 
method of "curriculum criticism." His conception is 
grounded on the techniques of the "new criticism" in 
literature. 
Mann's conception of curriculum criticism has been 
expanded by others. For instance, Willis (1978a) 
identifies three additional critical focus traditionally 
used in literary criticism which curriculum critics may 
attend to: the creator of the work, the universe, and the 
audience. Willis and Allen (1978) suggest that curriculum 
experience can be analyzed with the four structural 
elements used in analyzing literary experience: the text, 
the place of the text in history, the response of the 
reader, and the reader's psychological and biographical 
make-up. Kelly (1978) outlines a "rhetoric for the 
curriculum" consisting of "metaphor," "point of view," 
"plot," and "theme" (pp. 116-117). He proposes these four 
concepts as language tools for curriculum criticisms. 
Drawing from the tradition of art criticism rather 
than literary criticism, Vallance (1978) also conceives the 
curriculum as a work of art. She identifies eight 
similarities between curriculum and works of art that she 
believes justify approaching curriculum from an artistic 
perspective. According to Vallance, both curricula and 
works of art are (1) products of human construction, (2) 
means of communication, (3) transformations of forms, 
(4) selections of the total realm of experience, (5) 
participants in an ongoing historical development, 
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(6) products of a problem-solving process, (7) intentional 
activities, and (8) subjects of critical appraisal. She 
proposes the language of art criticism as the tool for 
illuminating the kind of experience that a curriculum 
provides to the students. She also describes six 
rhetorical devices that are consistently used by art 
critics to communicate an experience more vividly: (1) 
selective emphasis, (2) similes and metaphors, (3) inci-
dental comparison, (4) implied technique, (5) implied move-
ment, and (6) logically unnecessary adjectives. Vallance 
argues that curricula not only produce effects but they are 
also "lived in." They color students' experiences and cre-
ate a personal environment that is unique for each student. 
According to her, the dominant language in curriculum "with 
its predilection for identifying casual relationships 11 can-
not account for this 11 personal lived-in quality of curricu-
lum" (p. 144) . 
Speaking from their positions of art educators, Eisner 
(1985a) and Greene (1978) are more concerned with how the 
curriculum can be constructed so as to create those condi-
tions which allow students to develop their own personal 
meaning. They urge giving the arts a central place in the 
content of curriculum. Eisner (1985a), for example, argues 
that the emphasis on the three Rs has created an 
"unbalanced" curriculum that has weakened rather than 
strengthened the quality of children's education. He 
insists that it is not possible to have any semblance of 
curriculum balance unless the content areas needed for such 
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balance be included in the curriculum. Balance in the cur-
riculum, he argues, is not simply a plea for the equal rep-
resentation of the arts in curriculum content, but rather 
"an imperative for helping students learn how to expand 
their modes of consciousness" (p. 128). Eisner's notion of 
balance in curriculum is "rooted in an understanding of the 
nature and scope of cognition" (p. 128). According to him, 
the arts, like the sciences and mathematics, are cognitive 
activities; they are one of the symbol systems that humans 
use in order to know. symbol systems are also means 
through which consciousness is articulated. He maintains 
that the absence of artistic symbols in curriculum deprives 
students of the kinds of meaning that they can learn to 
create. He also states: 
If education has as one of its major aims the 
development of each child's ability to create 
meaning from experience, and if the construction 
of meaning requires the use of skills applied 
within a symbol system, then the absence of such 
systems within the curriculum is an impoverish-
ment of the quality of education children receive 
(p. 128). 
He suggests that such an education produces an 
"impoverished" mind. 
According to Greene (1978), the un-aesthetic character 
of education derives from a "sense of social structures and 
explanatory systems pressing down on human beings and ren-
dering them passive: gazers, not see-ers; hearers, not 
listeners" (p. 169). She suggests that the artistic-
aesthetic perspective is a challenge to such a view, and 
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she insists that this perspective "ought to be reaffirmed" 
in the school curriculum (p. 172). 
Greene visualizes the curriculum as "a number of 
provinces of meaning, each one associated with the kinds of 
experiences available to young people of different ages, 
with different biographies, and different locations in the 
social world" (1978, p. 174). One of these provinces of 
meaning, according to Greene, is the art world. She argues 
that perceptual encounters with this world bring people in 
touch with themselves. 
Freene also maintains that there are certain works of 
art that have been deliberately created to provoke the kind 
of reflectiveness that the school curriculum should develop 
in the students. She refers to this reflectiveness, after 
Alfred Schutz, as "wide-awakeness." By "wide-awakeness" 
she means an awareness of the quest of meaning which has so 
much to do with feeling alive in the world. It is an 
awakening of consciousness "originating in an attitude of 
full attention to life and its requirements" (1978, p. 
169) . This attention is active, not passive; passive 
attention is the opposite of full awareness. She also 
points out that "wide-awakeness" contributes to the · 
creation of the self, and awakens people to their freedom. 
For this reason, she believes that the arts ought to be 
central to any curriculum constructed today. She insists 
that educators must devise ways of integrating the arts to 
all levels of teaching. This needs to be done, she 
believes, "with a clear perception of what it means to 
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enable people to pay, from their own distinctive vantage 
points, 'full attention to life'" (p. 163). 
Dobson, Dobson, and Koetting (1985) propose, as a 
preliminary step of creating those conditions reflecting 
aesthetic values, the strategy of "awakening consciousness 
through dialogue" (p. 12). They assert that dialogue is a 
reflective process for "dealing with human qualities 
(internal manifestations of beliefs and values) which 
people bring to the arena of human interaction" (p. 13). 
It is a kind of conversation that seeks a form of 
transaction on which the freedom of those involved is 
maximized. According to these authors, the purpose of the 
dialogue is to clarify thoughts. They agree with Paulo 
Freire that an educational encounter placing dialogue as 
its center begins the dialogical process. And in this 
process, they assert, individuals "reflect on their being" 
and through the "building of new structures and meanings 
they become aware [that] they are building themselves in 
the process" (p. 12). 
In a different context, but with similar concerns, 
Koetting (1984) maintains that to enter into a dialogical 
relationship demands a strong commitment to human emancipa-
tion. He highlights Freire's (1971) six essential 
conditions required of those who enter into dialogue: 
1. a profound love of men 
2. humility 
3. an intense faith in man (this is an a priori faith 
in the person) 
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4. trust (established through dialogue) 
5. hope (rooted in the person's incompleteness, and 
recognition of that incompleteness; constant 
search) 
6. critical thinking (p. 12). 
According to Koetting, these conditions are "neither naive 
nor unworkable. They become, for subjects engaged in eman-
cipatory praxis, a basic orientation to life" (p. 12). 
Eisner's Approach to Evaluation 
Over the past decade, Elliot W. Eisner has been 
working with the collaboration of some of his students at 
Stanford University on a qualitative approach to evaluation 
attuned with the aesthetic paradigm. This approach is 
rooted in his interest in the role of the arts in human 
expression and in the contributions they make to human 
understanding. Rather than emphasizing the outcomes of the 
curriculum, Eisner's approach to evaluation focuses on the 
educational context in which the curriculum is actively and 
creatively experienced as valuable--the classroom. It 
installs the processes of classroom life at its center, and 
it demands that those processes be observed over extended 
periods of time. As Eisner (1985a) explains, his interest 
on process evaluation stems from the realization, shared 
with many other evaluators, that if we want to improve the 
ability of students to perform paying attention solely to 
outcomes is insufficient or even misguided. It is 
important, as he puts it, "to see how the game is played 
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during practice sessions and how rehearsals go before the 
curtain rises" (p. 179). 
Eisner's approach to evaluation is based on the work 
of those who inquire into the fine arts, the art critics. 
It requires what he calls "educational connoisseurship" and 
"educational criticism." He argues that connoisseurship 
and criticism represent two of the "modes through which we 
come to understand and express what we come to know" (p. 
102). The remainder of this section is concerned with 
these conceptions. 
Educational Connoisseurship 
Eisner {1985a) argues that the major function of 
evaluation from an educational point of view is the 
improvement of the quality of classroom life. But this 
improvement will result not from evaluation's attempts to 
discover scientific laws that can be applied universally to 
classrooms, but rather from enabling teachers and others 
concerned with educational practice to improve their 
ability to see and reflect about what they do. According 
to Eisner, educational practice is a complicated affair 
filled with contingencies that are extremely difficult to 
predict, let alone control. In order to make the 
appreciation of such complexity possible, he proposes the 
art of educational connoisseurship. By appreciation here 
Eisner means an awareness and an understanding of its 
characteristics and qualities. 
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Educational connoisseurship is the act of 
knowledgeable perception. It is the result of having 
developed "an array of differentiated schemata" that enable 
connoisseurs to discriminate subtleties, and to discern 
qualities and relationships that others are less likely to 
see (p. 153). Eisner defines "schemata" as a set of 
values, theories, models, concepts, and ideas. These 
"schemata" also allow connoisseurs to distinguish the 
significant from the trivial and to place what they see in 
an intelligible context. He agrees with U. Neisser that 
"schemata" perform essentially a selective function in 
perception. They regulate not only how but what is seen. 
Eisner also argues that the absence of schemata in our 
symbolic repertoire creates a kind of "self-fulfilling 
prophecy." He explains: 
One can look without seeing, listen without hear-
ing, eat without tasting, and touch without feel-
ing •••• What one does not have a schemata for, 
one is less able to experience .... Where schemata 
exits, the probability of experience is 
increased. In short, we tend to experience what 
we know how to find (pp. 151-152). 
He also shares with the art historian E. R. Gombrich the 
view that there is no value-free mode of seeing: "artists 
do not paint what they can see they see what they can 
paint" (p. 152). Thus, to be an educational connoisseur is 
to know how and what to see. 
According to Eisner, educational connoisseurship, like 
any art, is capable of development and refinement, and when 
developed to a high degree provides a level of awareness 
that makes intellectual clarity possible. Essentially, it 
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provides the content needed for reflection. In another 
text, Eisner (1985b) suggests several ways to develop high 
levels of connoisseurship regarding educational practice. 
What is involved in the development of 
educational connoisseurship is, first, the 
opportunity to attend to happenings of 
educational life in a focused, sensitive, and 
conscious way. Second, it requires the 
opportunity to compare such happenings, to 
discuss what one sees so that perceptions can be 
refined, to identify events not previously 
perceived, and to integrate and appraise what has 
been seen (p. 221) • 
The role of theory is also important in the cultivation of 
educational connoisseurship. He states: 
For the development of educational connoisseur-
ship, an understanding of different social sci-
ences, different theories of education, and a 
grasp of the history of education is not simply 
an intellectual ornament to be acquired within a 
graduate program but an essential working tool 
(p. 222). 
But above all, the development of educational connoisseur-
ship requires an intense desire "to perceive subtleties" 
and "to become a student of human behavior" (p. 220). 
Eisner further explains that educational connoisseur-
ship, as important as it is, is nevertheless a private act. 
It does not require a public disclosure of perceptions. 
However, educational connoisseurship is a necessary condi-
tion for doing useful educational criticism. As he 
explains: 
Connoisseurship, generally defined, is the art of 
appreciation. It is essential to criticism 
because without the ability to perceive what is 
subtle and important, criticism is likely to be 
superficial or even empty (p. 219). 
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In essence, educational connoisseurship "provides the 
fundamental core of realization that gives criticism its 
material" (p. 220). 
Educational Criticism 
Eisner (1985b) refers to educational criticism as the 
public side of educational connoisseurship. It is the act 
of publicly disclosing the qualities that connoisseurship 
perceives so that others can enter into the situation. The 
educational critics' function here is to serve as a 
"midwife to perception" (p. 217). They confront the 
difficult task of "lifting the veils that keep the eyes 
from seeing" (p. 217). Eisner agrees with John Dewey that 
the end of criticism is basically the "reeducation of 
perception" (p. 217) . 
Eisner notes that the qualities that educational 
criticism attempts to disclose are characteristically 
nondiscursive. In using language, however, criticism does 
not aspire to translate those qualities from one modality 
to another, but rather to create what Max Kozloff terms a 
"rendering." A "rendering" is essentially "an account of 
an experience, and never, as is sometimes supposed, a 
substitute for an experience" (p. 223). Eisner also 
indicates that the language of the critic resembles much 
that of the artist. It informs not by pointing to the 
qualities but rather by intimation. It "presents to our 
consciousness what the feeling of those qualities is" (p. 
226). The language of critics and artists is a 
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presentational rather than representational language. He 
distinguishes these types of languages as follows: 
Representational symbols, the type used in 
conventional discourse, are like signposts; they 
point one toward the qualities but are not 
themselves intended to possess expressive 
qualities. 'Listen, listen to the bird' is a 
literal discursive expression, but 'Hark! hark! 
the lark! ' contains an energy absent in the 
former. The former is representational; it 
directs our attention so that a certain kind of 
experience can be had. The latter presents us 
with a form that itself generates the excitement 
of the experience. The former is a conventional 
utterance, the later is poetic (p. 228). 
He suggests that presentational language is the central 
vehicle for revealing the qualitative aspects of classroom 
life. 
An educational criticism of a classroom typically 
takes the form of a written document whose aim is to help 
others to better see, understand, and appraise the quality 
of classroom practice. This document has three 
interconnected aspects: description, interpretation, and 
evaluation. 
The descriptive aspect of educational criticism is 
essentially an attempt to render in language the 
significant qualities of the classroom situation. Eisner 
identifies three major focal points of critical 
description. One critical focal point is the "pervasive 
qualities," that is, those qualities characterizing the 
situation. Another focal point of critical description is 
the "component qualities." These are the particular 
qualities within the whole. A third focal point is what he 
refers to as the "underlying qualities." Here the 
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educational critic may ask: "What are the rules by which 
educational life in this classroom operates?" (p. 231). 
The critical description of underlying qualities is fairly 
"thin," that is, it renders the qualities without getting 
very deeply into what they signify or mean. This task is 
pursued in critical interpretation. Eisner maintains that 
in order to perceive those qualities two conditions must be 
present: the qualities must be in the situation in the 
first place, and the educational critic must have the 
ability to note their presence. 
Eisner regards the descriptive aspect of educational 
criticism as making the most artistic demands on the educa-
tional critic. The critic's task is to provide a rich and 
vivid rendering that allows others to participate vicari-
ously in the qualities that they have not experienced 
directly. It is here, insists Eisner, that the "critic's 
verbal magic must be most acute" (p. 231). The critic must 
be able to capture the perceived qualities "through the 
possibilities within words" (p. 232). In this process, 
according to Eisner, the use of metaphor is centrally 
important. As he explains: 
In this process of transformation, metaphor is, 
of course, a centrally important device. Meta-
phor breaks the bonds of conventional usage to 
exploit the power of connotation and analogy. It 
capitalizes on surprise by putting meanings into 
new combinations and through such combinations 
awakens our senses. Metaphor is the arch enemy 
of the stock response (p. 226). 
He also argues that "nothing is more precise" in critical 
description than the use of metaphor (p. 227). 
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Eisner remarks that critical description is not a 
chronicle of happenings, but a creative construction of the 
situation; it is human construction. 
The second aspect, critical interpretation, represents 
an effort to empathetically understand the meaning of what 
has been perceived and vividly described. Critical inter-
pretation is guided by the general question: "What does the 
situation mean to those involved?" (p. 233). The interpre-
tation of meaning requires an understanding of contextual 
conditions. According to Eisner, the role of interpreta-
tion in educational criticism is closely related to the 
notion of "thick description" used by the anthropologists 
Gilbert Ryle and Clifford Geertz. Thick description aims 
at describing the significance of human events or behavior 
as they occur in a cultural network saturated with meaning. 
The role of theory is central in critical interpreta-
tion. Theory provides the conceptual maps and interpretive 
tools for understanding meanings. He recommends educa-
tional critics to ground their interpretations specifically 
on theoretical ideas of the social sciences, and of the 
history and philosophy of education. Critical interpreta-
tion also requires, according to Eisner, the judicious and 
informed use of the knowledge gained through training, and 
experience in classrooms. 
The evaluative aspect of educational criticism 
attempts to appraise the educational value of what has been 
perceived, described, and interpreted. The major function 
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of the educational critic here is to apply educational cri-
teria so that judgments are made on educational grounds. 
In the performance of this task, knowledge of the history 
and philosophy of education is crucial. The former pro-
vides the context necessary for purposes and comparisons 
and the latter the theories from which grounded value judg-
ments can be made. 
According to Eisner, it is the evaluative aspect of 
educational criticism that most sharply distinguish the 
work of educational critics from that of the anthropolo-
gists. Anthropologists, for instance, aspire to appear 
invisible within the culture they study. In addition, they 
have no obligation to appraise the value of a culture since 
they have no professional mission to change or improve it. 
Their interest is with understanding. Educational critics, 
however, are neither neutral observers nor disinterested 
interpreters. Furthermore, they are not only concerned 
with understanding but also with improving the educational 
situation. In this regard they have the professional obli-
gation to judge. 
Eisner notes that one of the issues that is most fre-
quently raised about educational criticism deals with 
objectivity. In response to this issue, Eisner redefines 
the notion of "objectivity" as a "function of intersubjec-
tive agreement among a community of believers" (p. 241) • 
In this view the question of whether criticism is really 
true does not proceed. Questions, for example, about use-
fulness and relevance are more adequate. Within this view, 
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then, educational criticism receives consensual validation 
through the criteria of "structural corroboration" and 
"referential adequacy" (p. 241). 
Structural corroboration seeks to establish the extent 
to which criticism forms a coherent whole. It seeks to 
determine if the pieces of evidence hold together and make 
sense. Referential adequacy is determined by checking the 
relationship between what the critic has written with the 
subject matter of criticism. If the criticism is useful, 
the reader should be able to experience the situation in a 
new, more adequate way. 
Beyond the issue of objectivity, Eisner explains that 
the need for unanimity among critics is not characteristic 
of educational criticism. It recognizes that complex 
situations such as classrooms are as "multilayered" as 
works of art, and different critics will find different 
qualities to describe, interpret, and evaluate. Educa-
tional criticism, as Eisner points out, does not seek a 
single definitive criticism but rather criticism that is 
useful. He writes: 
The cultivation of such productive diversity is a 
virtue, not a vice. As in education itself, we 
do not seek to create an army marching in step to 
the same tune but individuals who follow their 
own drummer as long as the beat is interesting 
(1985b, p. 244). 
For Eisner, the major virtue of his proposed approach 
is that it expands our understanding of how we come to 
know, and as a consequence it makes new avenues for 
evaluation possible. He believes that even if this 
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approach does not succeed in becoming the major mode of 
evaluation, that contribution may be enough to have made 
the effort worthwhile. 
The acceptance of Eisner's approach in particular and 
the aesthetic paradigm in general has significant implica-
tions for the curriculum evaluation field. These implica-
tions are discussed in the coming chapter. 
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CHAPTER V 
IMPLICATIONS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Introduction 
The previous three chapters were devoted to fulfill the 
basic purposes of this study. Chapters II and III examined 
the natural science paradigm, a paradigm which was initially 
identified as dominating the field of curriculum evaluation. 
A proposed alternative to this dominant paradigm, namely, 
the aesthetic paradigm, was then presented in Chapter IV. 
The information thus far obtained provides for answering the 
guiding questions of this study concerning the philosoph-
ical, conceptual and methodological tools that these 
paradigms provide for practicing curriculum evaluation 
activities. 
The present chapter completes this study of paradigms. 
It is divided in three additional sections. The first of 
these sections discusses some of the implications of the 
aesthetic alternative for the field of curriculum evalua-
tion. The second is a concluding section. Finally, the 
closing section of this study offers some recommendations 




Proponents of the aesthetic paradigm insist that this 
is the paradigm of choice. They make a number of educa-
tional claims on its behalf. Eisner (1985a), for example, 
maintains that this paradigm offers the tools for illuminat-
ing the richness and complexity that constitutes life in 
classrooms. Jenkins and O'Toole (1978) claim that it is of 
special relevance for understanding the essential meanings 
of the hidden curriculum. Willis (1978a) insist that this 
alternative must be chosen in order to assure a full and 
comprehensive view of educational environments. But what is 
the significance of choosing this alternative for guiding 
the field of curriculum evaluation? What, in other words, 
is implied in this choice? In choosing the aesthetic 
paradigm, the following seven implications are evident. 
First, the aesthetic paradigm implies that the curricu-
lum can only be evaluated in relation to the context in 
which it functions, that is, the total classroom situation. 
If this notion is accepted in the field, certain significant 
consequences follow. One of these is the rejection of the 
experimental approach to curriculum evaluation. This 
approach, as previously noted, tends to isolate the curricu-
lum being evaluated from contextual conditions. This is 
usually done through the application of the strategy of ran-
domization and statistical techniques, or by imposing the 
artificiality of the laboratory setting. The laboratory, as 
Guba and Lincoln (1981) point out, is the "essence of the 
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context-free environment" (p. 74). Another consequence is 
the abandonment of the behavioral evaluation model. Behav-
iorists take a reductionist stance; that is, they reduce the 
curriculum to a set of specific objectives which are then 
evaluated independently of the whole. Adherents of the 
aesthetic alternative, on the contrary, assume a wholistic 
stance. In fact, Willis (1978b) makes the claim that the 
phenomenon called curriculum defined in its fullest dimen-
sion is itself the classroom situation taken as a whole. A 
third effect is that the emphasis on product evaluation must 
be replaced for a process orientation. To be concerned with 
process demands evaluators to spend substantial periods of 
time in classrooms. Process evaluation is based on exten-
sive observation. A product evaluation is a quick procedure 
which usually takes 15 to 20 minutes (Eisner, 1985b). It is 
often referred to as the "hit-and-run" approach. 
Second, the aesthetic paradigm implies that the evalua-
tor actively participates in the evaluation situation. This 
implication involves a rejection of the positivist assump-
tion of passivity. Positivism, as noted earlier, assigns 
human beings the role of passive observers who confine them-
selves to copy the elements of a given reality. The aes-
thetic alternative, on the contrary, places human beings in 
the role of active participants. In addition, it replaces 
the notion of given-ness for a constructivist conception of 
reality. According to constructivists, human beings create 
their own reality through a construction process analogous 
to the creative process of the artist (Donmoyer, 1981). 
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Third, the aesthetic paradigm implies that the evalua-
tor should have practical experience in classrooms. As Eis-
ner (1985b) observes, since the 1960s much curriculum 
evaluation work has been done by outsiders of the field, 
particularly behavioral scientists. He suggests that the 
principal motive of this group is not so much to change 
classroom practices as it is to advance their research 
methodologies. He maintains that it is the function of 
evaluation to change classrooms. Since the task of the 
evaluator, according to Eisner, is to make judgments about 
what needs to be changed, hejshe must have a great deal of 
knowledge and experience with classroom practices; that is, 
he/she must be a "connoisseur." This notion suggests that 
evaluation should be done by internal rather than external 
evaluators. 
Fourth, the aesthetic paradigm implies that classroom 
observations are value-dependent. This means that the 
classroom situation can not be objectively described. 
Descriptive statements about classrooms are value-laden. A 
significant effect of acknowledging the presence of values 
in descriptions involves a rejection to the positivist claim 
that assertive statements are value-free. This fourth 
implication is important to the field because it will 
require evaluators not only to make explicit their values 
but also to justify their value choices. 
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Fifth, the aesthetic paradigm implies that curriculum 
evaluation is essentially a judgmental activity. This means 
that evaluators, in addition to describing the classroom 
situation, must render judgments of value. According to 
Eisner (1985b), since there are many conceptions of what 
constitutes educational virtue, evaluative judgments would 
differ one from the other; but the need to make judgments is 
inevitable because evaluation is, after all, a normative 
discipline. He also maintains that the fact that judgments 
differ is not necessarily a liability in evaluation; it 
could be a strength. For example, it could open up the kind 
of discussion that educational practice should but does not 
now receive. According to him, educators for too long have 
approached educational problems as if simple and universal 
solutions existed. Discussion of values would encourage 
educators to seek more diverse solutions to educational 
problems. This idea of rendering judgments is rejected by 
adherents of the dominant paradigm. As mentioned earlier, 
they hold that judgmental statements are based on value 
terms that are primarily the expression of emotions rather 
than assertions of anything. They are, therefore, cogni-
tively meaningless. 
Sixth, the aesthetic paradigm also implies that value 
judgments are relative. Relativism holds that there are no 
objective standards on which any value claim can be based; 
the very notion of standards is value-dependent. The basis 
of judgments is then relative, differing according to 
events, circumstances, people, etc. This relativistic 
stance can be noted, for instance, when Eisner (1985b) 
argues that 
The differences in basic assumptions among Freudi-
ans, Rogerians, Skinnereans, Heiderians, Eriksoni-
ans, Piagetians, and the like are not resolvable 
through science. The fundamental theoretical 
structures through which each defines psychological 
reality differ, and there is no critical test that 
will resolve the truth or falsity of their respec-
tive belief systems. Each has a community of 
believers who reaffirm the beliefs of those working 
within the system (p. 241) . 
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He then maintains that to claim that a belief system is true 
is to embrace a hopeless correspondence theory of truth. In 
regard to judgments of value, the leading positivist Carnap, 
for instance, argues that the fact that they can not be 
proved or disproved through science demonstrates that they 
are not scientific statements; value judgments are simply 
metaphysical expressions without any sense at all (in White, 
1955) . 
Finally, the aesthetic paradigm implies that descrip-
tive as well as normative statements in curriculum evalua-
tion contain both emotional and cognitive components. As 
previously indicated, the dominant position holds that only 
descriptions of what is are cognitive statements. These 
statements can be verified empirically. But the statements 
of normative ethics have no empirical referent since they 
are non-cognitive. They are simply emotive expressions. 
According to the aesthetic perspective, the separation of 
emotions and cognitions misconstrues the nature of human 
experience. It then postulates that human experience con-
stitutes a unity. As Eisner (1985a) expresses it: 
This orientation to knowledge embraces an episte-
mology that rejects the positivistic view which 
holds that only formal propositions can, in princi-
ple, provide knowledge. It rejects the view that 
affect and cognition are independent spheres of 
human experience (p. 198). 
In this particular, the aesthetician Berleant (1970) con-
tends that if the unity of experience is recognized, a 
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rejection to the emotivist thesis of values advanced by pas-
itivists follows. As a consequence, the status of aesthetic 
inquiry will be restored. According to him, positivists by 
assigning a non-cognitive dimension to the evaluational con-
tent of normative judgments have contributed to the exclu-
sian of aesthetic inquiry from the realm of knowledge. Like 
Eisner (1985a), Berleant maintains that aesthetic inquiry is 
a legitimate cognitive activity. 
Conclusions 
This study was introduced by asserting that the field 
of curriculum evaluation is at present in a crisis state. 
This assertion was further supported by identifying four 
major signs indicative of this crisis. One of these signs, 
the emergence of competing paradigms, provided guidance for 
articulation of the basic purposes of this study. First, 
this study examined selected philosophical, conceptual and 
methodological aspects of the paradigm presently dominating 
the curriculum evaluation field. This dominant paradigm, as 
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indicated, comes from the positivist tradition of the 
natural sciences. As a second purpose, a proposed 
alternative to this dominant paradigm, namely, the aesthetic 
paradigm, was then explained. In addition to this 
examination, this study explored the major implications of 
accepting the aesthetic alternative for curriculum 
evaluation. 
In relation to the paradigmatic aspects here examined, 
four conclusions are presented: 
First, the natural science and the aesthetic paradigms 
are based on differing conceptions of the world. In fact, 
so different are the worlds they define that one gets the 
immediate impression that there is no means of comparing 
these conceptions at all. It is as though their advocates 
were speaking of two separate worlds: the scientific and 
the aesthetic worlds. For example, scientists speak of a 
world governed by invariable natural laws where its 
phenomena are linearly related in terms of cause and 
effects. Artists, on the other hand, speak of a world 
constituted of particular qualities of inexhaustible 
complexity and multiple realms of meaning. No wonder, the 
aesthetician Ernest Cassirer figuratively expressed in An 
Essay of Man (1953) that " ... art and science move in 
entirely different planes, they cannot ... thwart one 
another" (quoted in Eisner, 1985b, p. 225). But since art 
and science are in competition, they indeed have established 
a point of comparison. That is, artists and scientists are 
expressing their views about a common world. And these 
views of the world differ one from another. 
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Second, these two paradigms are based on opposing 
philosophical assumptions. ontologically, the dominant nat-
ural science paradigm assumes that reality is a given. It 
exists "out there" independently of the human mind; that is, 
it is objective. The aesthetic paradigm, however, postu-
lates that reality is a human construction. It is 
constructed and re-constructed in the process of interpreta-
tion. These interpretations of reality are viewed as 
diverging since it is believed that they are influenced by 
personal values and beliefs. 
At the level of epistemology, the dominant paradigm 
conceives knowing as a passive picturing of facts. Accord-
ing to the positivist Wittgenstein, any knowledge claim is 
true if there is a correspondence between the picture and 
the facts it intends to represent. This correspondence is 
verified through the application of the scientific method. 
The aesthetic paradigm rejects this assumption of passivity. 
It acknowledges the active involvement and response of the 
participant in the process of knowing. Knowing is described 
here as the exploration of subtle particulars and their 
interrelationships. This alternative also replaces the con-
cept of "truth" for the notion of "meaning". According to 
Eisner (1985a), truth implies singularity and consistency; 
while meaning implies diversity and coherence. 
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In relation to axiology, the dominant paradigm assumes 
that only those statements couched in scientific and numeri-
cal statements are truth assertions about the world. These 
terms are considered to be value-free. The aesthetic 
paradigm holds that every statement is valuational. It 
posits that there is no value-free mode of seeing. Gom-
brich's expression is often cited as representing this axio-
logical posture: "artists do not paint what they can see; 
they see what they can paint" (Eisner, 1985a, p. 152). 
Third, these paradigms offer evaluators a distinct def-
inition of the entity to be evaluated, that is, the curricu-
lum. For instance, a practitioner of the dominant paradigm 
works within a behavioral definition of curriculum. The 
curriculum is defined here as consisting of a series of 
intended outcomes expressed in terms of measurable, observ-
able behaviors. The function of the curriculum, according 
to Tyler (1949), is to change the behavior patterns of the 
students. The evaluation of the curriculum involves an 
assessment of effectiveness. The curriculum is considered 
effective if a congruence exists between its intended out-
comes and the behavior exhibited by the students at the end 
point of instruction. This congruence is determined by sta-
tistically analyzing the results of standardized achievement 
tests. Under the aesthetic paradigm, the curriculum is con-
ceived as analogous to the works of artists. Works of art, 
according to Greene (1978), are deliberately created to pro-
voke awareness and critical reflection. It is also believed 
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that the curriculum, like a work of art, has multiple levels 
of meaning that can be experienced and disclosed. The pro-
cess of evaluating the curriculum is similar to criticism in 
the arts. The curriculum evaluator is to attune him or her-
self to curricular activity much as an art critic would 
experience and appraise a painting or a film. According to 
Vallance (1978), the goal of the evaluator is to render a 
judgment of the quality of experience that the curriculum 
provides for the students. 
And finally, these paradigms provide their adherents 
incompatible modes of practicing curriculum evaluation. For 
example, evaluators working within the dominant paradigm 
employ scientific approaches to curriculum evaluation; while 
evaluators adhering to the aesthetic alternative paradigm 
rely upon the use of artistic approaches. The present study 
reveals that there are six major dimensions on which these 
approaches to curriculum evaluation differ. 
One difference resides on the focal point. The scien-
tific mode, for instance, focuses on observable behavior. 
The behavior of sample groups are statistically analyzed in 
order to make inference about the population from which the 
samples were selected. The question of interest here is 
whether a difference as that found in the samples also 
exists in the population. The artistic mode, in contrast, 
is concerned with what is nonobservable. It focuses on the 
meaning dimension. The major interest here is in under-
standing the meaning of human experience. 
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A second difference between these two modes is in 
emphasis. The scientific approach to evaluation is outcome-
oriented. It emphasizes the measurement of curriculum out-
comes. The purpose is to verify whether the objectives of 
the curriculum have been achieved. This is usually verified 
through the application of the experimental method. Experi-
mentation, as described earlier, consists of designing and 
performing laboratory experiments on which the curriculum 
variable is manipulated and extraneous variables are con-
trolled. The artistic mode, however, emphasizes process 
evaluation. It employs the technique of criticism for 
describing and interpreting the processes of the classroom. 
The goal of criticism is to render an evaluative judgment 
about the quality of classroom experience. 
The third difference relates to the sources of evalua-
tive data. Within the scientific approach, evaluative data 
are principally collected through the use of standardized 
instruments, particularly with norm-referenced achievement 
tests. In the artistic mode, the human instrument (the 
critic) is the major source of data. He/she is a connois-
seur of classrooms who relies upon his/her perceptabilities, 
sensibilities, and knowledge gained through training and 
experience. According to Eisner (1985a), there are three 
advantages of using the human as instrument. First, many 
events that might be significant for those involved in the 
situation might not find a place on a standardized instru-
ment. The human instrument pays attention to significant 
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events. Second, the human instrument is the only that can 
place events in a historical context. And third, the human 
instrument is able to recognize what is subtle, and yet sig-
nificant. No other instrument, Eisner maintains, can do 
this. 
The fourth difference is the form of representation 
used. The scientific mode employs a conventional or discur-
sive form of representation, i.e. numbers. The data col-
lected are expressed in quantitative terms. Quantification, 
according to Gay (1980), provides more precise and unambigu-
ous descriptions than the verbal statement. He also claims 
that quantitative statements offer much more information, 
and provide an objective basis for comparison. Artistic 
approaches to evaluation rely upon the use of nondiscursive 
forms of representation; e.g., poetic language. According 
to Eisner (1985a), nondiscursive forms inform not by 
pointing but through intimation. They render an account of 
an experience which generates excitement. 
The fifth dimension on which these approaches to cur-
riculum evaluation differ is in their ultimate aim. The 
scientific mode aims at producing nomological generaliza-
tions (laws) that can provide dependable basis for 
predicting and controlling the outcomes of the curriculum. 
Scientific generalizations, as Koetting (1984) notes, are 
considered to be "truth statements outside of time and 
specific context" (p. 9). According to Eisner (1983), the 
formulation of laws for prediction and control has been a 
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dream of educational scientists since the early 1900s. He 
then argues that the current over-concern for efficiency and 
effectiveness in the school is nothing else than a 
reflection of such a dream. The artistically-oriented 
approach to evaluation does not aim to control or to produce 
predictions. It is after understanding. It is believed 
that with such understanding the ability of individuals to 
grasp and deal with situations like those portrayed in the 
evaluation will be increased (Eisner, 1985a). 
The last difference between these two approaches lies 
in the criteria used for judging the validity_of the evalua-
tion. The scientific mode is concerned with the question of 
objectivity. To meet the criterion of objectivity is a req-
uisite for establishing trust in the evaluative findings. 
An objective evaluation is defined as one which yields 
findings that are a function solely of the conditions of the 
evaluation and not of the interests, motives, and values of 
the evaluator (Guba and Lincoln, 1981) . The artistic 
approach to evaluation, on the contrary, acknowledges the 
influence of the evaluator. The artistic evaluator, 
according to Eisner (1985b), is neither a neutral observer 
nor a disinterested interpreter. An artistic evaluation 
receives validation, then, through the processes of 
structural corroboration and referential adequacy. 
Structural corroboration establishes the degree of coherence 
of the evaluation. The evaluation meets this criterion of 
coherence if the pieces of evidence support one another and 
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make sense. In order for the evaluation to be referentially 
adequate, it must meet the criterion of usefulness. A 
useful evaluation is one which allows others to experience 
the situation portrayed in a new, more enlightened way. 
These six differences between scientific and artistic 
approaches to curriculum evaluation provide support for this 
conclusion about their incompatibility. According to Guba 
(1983), in a competition between incompatible modes one is 
"dealing with an either-or proposition in which you 'puts 
yer money and yer takes yer cherce! '" (p.3). 
Recommendations for Future Studies 
As indicated in the introduction of this study, there 
are four competing paradigms in the field of curriculum 
evaluation, namely, the dominant natural science paradigm, 
and the legal, the anthropological, and the aesthetic emerg-
ing alternatives. One significant contribution of the pre-
sent study is that, by identifying this competition, it 
provides the rationale for conducting future studies of 
paradigms in curriculum evaluation. 
This study has already examined the philosophical, con-
ceptual, and methodological components of the natural 
science and the aesthetic paradigms. Other paradigmatic 
components need to be examined. For instance, future 
studies might emphasize the psychological and sociological 
components. Other studies might explore the ideologies 
behind these paradigms. In deciding the focus for 
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ideological studies particularly, Michael Apple's 
suggestions might provide some guidance. For example, in 
his paper "Commonsense Categories and Curriculum Thought" 
(1975a), he suggests that the language categories used by 
positivists serve to legitimate the dominant values of the 
economic system. Related to the aesthetic perspective, 
Apple (1978) argues, with the cultural critic George Lukacs, 
that the "true bearers of ideology in art are the very 
forms, rather than the abstractable content, of the work 
itself" p. 506). He asks, for instance, why curriculum 
critics have chosen specifically literary forms for 
curriculum evaluation? He insists that these forms need to 
be ideologically analyzed. They too may serve important 
economic functions. 
It is also recommended that studies be undertaken 
directed to explore how interrelated fields, e.g., curricu-
lum development, instruction, and supervision, will be 
affected by accepting the aesthetic paradigm in the curricu-
lum evaluation field. It would be significant to explore 
some of the problems of adopting this alternative paradigm. 
For instance, is it a political problem to bring this kind 
of change in evaluation, as Eisner (1985a) suggests? Is it 
an economic problem? Who shall make the decision of change? 
These areas deserve consideration. 
The need for studying the other paradigms, i.e., the 
legal and the anthropological, has been already suggested. 
In particular, these studies could focus on the aspects rec-
ommended above in order to provide a common basis for com-
parison. 
The primary intent of future studies should be to help 
curriculum evaluators make an informed choice of the 
paradigm that would guide the future of the field of cur-
riculum evaluation. It is hoped that the present study of 
paradigms would make some contribution to that end. 
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